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Abstract 
Corporate social performance and financial performance are 
becoming key battlegrounds for competitive advantage as both are 
considered simultaneously when firms are evaluated in the markets.  
There is also a strong impetus to diversify corporate boards as the 
literature recognizes composition of board of directors is an important 
factor in corporate decision making. In this thesis, I examine the 
association between female directors, corporate social performance 
(CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). 
Using a sample of 1,540 US firms over a 17-year (1996-2013) 
period, I find a positive correlation between the proportion of female 
directors and CSP. Having a higher proportion of female directors on 
the board exerts a stronger influence on CSP metrics which focus on 
positive social practices. The proportion of female directors influences 
negative CSP only when a firm’s strategy is focused on innovation. 
Thus, an enabling environment which supports innovation and 
encourages the capacity of females to participate actively in the 
product development process results in less negative social practices. 
The analysis of CSP-CFP nexus shows that in the presence of a 
higher proportion of female directors, the strength dimension of CSP 
has a less positive affect on CFP, whilst the concern dimension of 
CSP less negatively affects firm value.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
There has been growing media attention directed at the social 
impact of firms’ operations. Firms are coming under increasing 
pressure to be more sustainable with consumers paying extra 
attention to corporate environmental records. Poor social 
performance can increase a firm’s financial risk (Mcguire, 1988), and 
investors have been known to discount the share price of firms which 
are poorly positioned to compete in a world affected by climate 
change (Lash and Wellington, 2007). However, corporate endeavours 
prioritizing social concerns may hit a ceiling due to the profit 
maximization goal of shareholders. Boards of directors thus face 
ambiguity in understanding distinct stakeholders’ concerns. Arguing 
that the board should be sufficiently representative to address 
distinct stakeholder concerns, this study examines whether a more 
diverse board is associated with firms’ investment in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), and how such initiatives in turn influence firm 
performance. Since gender diverse boards are one of the noteworthy 
governance issues examined in the literature (Singh et al., 2008), this 
study examines board diversity in gender. 
Studies of gender stereotypes associate females with traits such 
as empathy, caring, concern for others, and being interested in long-
term relations (Rosener, 2003; Eagly, 2009; Boulouta, 2013). Hence, 
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it is conceivable that having more females on the board increase 
firms’ propensity to better address social demands as these 
behaviours correlate with female gender characteristics. A board’s 
social decision often represents the compromise of conflicting 
demands of stakeholders, and requires understanding, commitments, 
and actions not just towards shareholders but also to a broad array 
of actors including employees, communities, suppliers, and 
governments (Sharma and Henriques, 2005; Konard et al., 2006). I 
thus argue that having more females on the board increases firms’ 
attention to sustainable development, and to better address social 
demands. What is not clear is how female directors’ social orientation 
relates to the financial health of the firm. Specifically, does the social 
sensitivity of female directors enhance bottom-line results or just add 
investment burden and cost to the firm? 
There is also a window-dressing view, where firms put females 
on boards merely for legitimacy and public visibility without concerns 
for their contributions. Boards are under increasing pressure to 
select female directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), with some 
countries even imposing mandatory gender quota. For example, 
Norwegian companies must achieve a 40% female quota from 2008 
onwards; in Sweden, there are legal penalties for firms that fail to 
maintain a 25% quota for females; in Germany, firms must adopt a 
30% quota for women directors from 2015 (CWDI, 2015).  
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In an attempt to “look good”, firms with high public visibility, 
typically large firms with good performance, have higher propensity to 
appoint females (Fryxell and Lerner, 1989). Therefore, the presence of 
female directors may enhance corporate image and act as a signal to 
others that the firms is socially responsible. 
While recognizing the important contributions of prior studies, 
my thesis builds upon and extends the extant literature by more 
rigorously examining the link between gender diversity on the board 
and firms’ performance on social activities. Scholars are showing 
increasing interest in the link between corporate social performance 
(CSP) and gender. A large part of the literature is based on surveys 
measuring females’ orientation toward social issues (Ibrahim and 
Angelidis, 1994; Ibrahim et al., 2009). A limitation of survey studies 
is that the actual social behaviour of board members might be 
different from that intended (William, 2003). Other studies focus only 
on a particular aspect of CSP such as philanthropy (Wang and Coffey, 
1992; William, 2003), the working environment (Bernardi et al., 
2006), the natural environment (Post et al., 2011), or ethics (Ibrahim 
et al., 2010). However, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is multi-
dimensional, requiring a multiple-item measurement to reflect a 
complete view of a company’s social performance (Griffin and Mahon, 
1997). The few studies which examine the influence of female 
directors on multidimensional CSP show mixed results. Zhang (2012) 
finds no evidence that female directors improve negative social 
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practices (the concern dimension of CSP). In contrast, Boulouta 
(2013) finds that female directors exert a stronger influence on 
negative/poor social practices. Other studies consider only positive 
social practices (Bear et al., 2010; Mallin, 2011). An important 
shortcoming of these studies is that they have not properly addressed 
endogeneity issues, in particular simultaneity bias. That is, it is likely 
that firm with higher CSP employ more female rather than female 
affects CSP. Only Boulouta (2013) considers endogeneity issues but 
the short time frame (1999-2003) and small sample size (N=175) limit 
the generalizability of her results. 
1.2  Research Aim and Question 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the association between the 
proportion of female directors and CSP. More specifically, my 
research examines whether a higher proportion of female directors 
exhibit better CSP. A two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach is 
utilized to control for potential endogeneity between gender diversity 
and social performance. I also take into consideration specific 
business environments, such as litigious industry and innovation 
intensive firms, and examine whether these specific environment 
induce a more gender diverse board to undertake more CSR 
programs. 
Next, I examine whether the social sensitivity of female directors 
enhance bottom-line results or just add cost burden to the firm. To 
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be precise, I examine whether female directors are better able in 
dealing with the increasingly important issues of CSP and how this 
relation affects financial performance. The increasing external 
pressures for better corporate social performance (Lash and 
Wellington, 2007), profit maximization, and increased participation of 
females on the board (Singh et al., 2008) motivate me to examine the 
interaction of these three factors.  
 1.3  Significance and Contribution 
Gender composition of the board is an important aspect of 
corporate governance. The importance of gender diversity is raised in 
recent proposals for governance reform (Council, 2012). Females 
differ from males in terms of personality traits, communication style, 
educational background, and career experience (Feingold, 1994; 
Buss, 2005), and it is within these differences that females are 
thought to be able to make a significant contribution to board 
effectiveness (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Therefore, knowing whether 
female directors are better in addressing firms’ responsibility towards 
society and how their social orientation affects the firm’s financial 
health is important given that CSR and CFP are becoming key 
battlegrounds for competitive advantage ( Hart and Milstein, 2003; 
Hoffman, 2005; López et al., 2007). 
This thesis differs from previous studies in several ways. First, I 
focus on the female directors’ attachment to nature, and risk aversion 
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and explain how these characteristics may help improve CSP in terms 
of managing stakeholders demand. Extant literature provide some 
understanding of how female directors address CSP. However, 
methodological weakness of small datasets, endogeneity problems, 
the use of a specific CSP and procedural weakness of treating 
multidimensional CSP cause some uncertainty of the effect of gender 
on CSP. Drawing on social role theory and female directors’ risk 
aversion, I build upon and extend prior studies by examining the 
association between the proportion of female directors and CSP with 
the use of a multidimensional CSP and much larger sample of firms 
over a longer time frame.  
Second, I examine how the social sensitivity of female directors 
affects firms’ financial performance. It is important to evaluate 
financial impact of female directors’ CSR initiatives as firm’s financial 
health is the ultimate test for the success or failure of any strategic 
initiatives (Luo and Bhattcharya, 2006). This type of research is 
limited given the current situation, where profitability and social 
outcomes both are taken together when firms are evaluated in the 
markets (Hart and Milstein, 2003;  López et al., 2007). No published 
research has simultaneously explored the links between female 
directors and CSP and their likely impact on CFP. By developing and 
testing the hypotheses with a sample of US firms, this thesis aims to 
expand our understanding of the potential influence of female 
directors on CSP-CFP nexus. This study is thus significant in that it 
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provides insights on the link between CSP and financial performance. 
In the face of long debate on CSP-CFP nexus, this thesis is significant 
for researchers and practitioners as it provides empirical evidence to 
verify whether the proportion of female directors’ social sensitivity 
adds to bottom line result of the firm. This will help practitioners to 
determine whether female directors on boards assist them in 
addressing CSP-CFP nexus effectively. 
Third, I adopt a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to 
control for potential endogeneity between female directors, social 
performance and firm performance. Endogeneity concerns arise 
because of omitted unobservable firm variables and reverse causality 
bias (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), but studies on gender diversity and 
social performance rarely consider the endogeneity issue. This thesis 
utilizes 2SLS method since the instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
approach has been found to significantly improve the robustness of 
empirical results (Margolish and Walsh 2003). The instrumental 
variables are selected based on theoretical grounds and adequately 
tested for both validity and relevance. 
1.4  Summary of Major Findings 
Based on a sample of 9,097 firm-year observations, 
representing 1,540 unique US firms over the period 1996-2013, I find 
that a more gender diverse board significantly enhances positive 
social practices and total CSP. The results are robust to reverse 
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causality and omitted variable bias. They are also robust to the 
consideration of litigation risk and innovative intensity in the 
analysis. 
I find no evidence that the proportion of female directors affect 
negative CSP, irrespective of the consideration of litigation risk. It is 
possible that female directors have less discretion on improving 
negative social practices. As negative CSP is dubious/risky strategies, 
sex-based bias or gender stereotyping in the boardroom (Bilimoria et 
al., 1994, Galbreath, 2011) may be inhibiting female directors’ voice 
on this issue. I find that having a higher proportion of female 
directors on the board has an influence on negative social practices 
only to the extent that a firm’s strategy is focused on innovation 
(measured by R&D Intensity). Therefore, firms whose strategies are 
more focused on innovation may support female directors’ capacity to 
be actively involved in innovation and to raise voice on negative CSP 
in board decision making, and hence, experience less negative CSP. 
The analysis of CSP-CFP nexus shows that in presence of higher 
proportion of female directors, the strength dimension of CSP has 
less positive affect on CFP, whilst concern dimension of CSP less 
negatively affects firm value.  
1.5  Thesis Layout 
The reminder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 
reviews the relevant literature on the topic, while Chapter 3 develops 
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testable hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the data and research 
method and Chapter 5 presents empirical results. Finally, Chapter 6 
summarises and concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature on 
whether gender differences in terms of behaviours and attitudes play 
a significant role in explaining cross-sectional differences in corporate 
social performance. It begins with a review of survey studies on 
gender orientation towards social issues in Section 2.2. A limitation 
of survey studies is that the actual social behaviour may well differ 
from that intended (William, 2003). To overcome this limitation, a 
number of studies provide an empirical analysis of female directors’ 
influence on firms’ decision on social issues. These studies differ in 
how they measure CSP; some use the KLD ratings, as discussed in 
Section 2.3, while others consider different databases including 
FAMA ratings and Ceres research-specialized data, as discussed in 
Section 2.4. The evidence is mixed. In Section 2.5, evidence from 
social disclosure is discussed. A chapter summary, with major 
conclusions drawn from the review, is provided in Section 2.6.  
2.2  Evidence from Survey Studies 
A large group of literature focus on surveys measuring gender 
orientation towards social issues which has begun in earnest in the 
1970s. Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) review groups of studies in 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s on gender differences in environmental 
attitude. They conclude there are gender differences on concerns for 
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nuclear power and radio-active waste in the 1970s, with women 
expressing greater concerns. Similar results are also found in surveys 
of risk-related environmental issues conducted in the 1980s and 
1990s. However, they report that “general environment” surveys 
demonstrate no gender gap. 
 Bord and O'Çonnor (1997) endeavour to explain the reason for 
the gender difference in attitudes to the environment. He analyses 
two national surveys which show that females are more concerned 
than males about hazardous waste and global warming issues. He 
argues that question formats that ask for level of ‘seriousness’ or 
‘concern’ strongly connote risk. As hazardous waste is identified as 
most-feared environmental threat, females express more concern. The 
author explains that the reason for the differences in environmental 
attitudes is the differences in vulnerability to environmental risks not 
differences in biological sensitivities. Therefore, in surveys that 
measures ecological attitudes in ways that trigger risk perceptions, 
females will always score higher in concern compared to their male 
counterparts. 
A similar study is executed by Ibrahim and Angelidis (1994) 
where they survey social responsiveness orientation of corporate 
board members. Based on a survey of 398 corporate directors on 
their corporate social awareness, they find that female directors have 
a greater orientation toward charitable giving, whereas male directors 
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tend to be more concerned with economic performance. They 
attribute this to females’ inherent orientation toward philanthropy. 
The authors acknowledge that the results may be driven by female 
directors who tend to be present in economically successful firms, 
and hence, can afford the luxury of being sensitive to philanthropic 
needs.  
Using survey data from 1,022 questionnaires collected from the 
pharmaceutical industry Wehrmeyer and McNeil (2000) confirm that 
females exhibit greater environmental orientation in the workplace. 
Using factor analysis, they find that females are more actively 
involved in environmentally friendly behaviour and place more 
emphasis on the role of technology in finding solutions to 
environment problems than males. Their explanation is that females 
are more sensitive to environmental exploitation due to their 
experience in a culture with paternalistic exploitation. 
To understand green-buying or ecologically responsive 
behaviours, and the factors that predict them, Mainieri et al. (1997) 
survey middle-class communities’ awareness of the environmental 
impact of products. They argue that household consumers are most 
likely aware of the importance of environmental issues and consider 
them in their purchasing decision. Based on 201 respondents from 
Los Angeles, they find that females show more concerns about 
environmental matters in their purchase decisions. However, they do 
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not find any gender differences on matters concerning the 
preservation of natural resources, the undertaking of initiatives to 
protect the environment, and the purchase of environmental friendly 
products. They explain that females are more pro-environment than 
males in specific beliefs, general attitudes, and proenvironment 
behavior, however, these factors are not related to green-buying 
behaviours.  
2.3 Evidence from KLD Rating 
Given the multidimensional concept of CSP, a most widely used 
measure is KLD index (Kinder Lyderberg Domini) which measures 
social performance in seven areas. These include corporate 
governance, products, employees, human rights, community, 
environment and diversity.  The KLD index includes both 
positive/exemplary practices (strength dimension) and 
negative/socially dubious practices (concern dimension). Several 
studies have viewed social performance along a single continuum, i.e. 
linear aggregation of positive and negative practices, whereas others 
split it into positive and negative dimension. In this section, I review a 
group of studies that examine the impact of the female directors’ on 
positive, negative and overall performance of CSP. 
 Manner (2010) examines the factors that influence CSP and 
proposes that observable CEO characteristics can predict cross-
sectional differences in CSP between firms. To empirically test their 
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proposition, the author uses upper echelon theory. Using a sample of 
650 public US firms, the study finds that female CEOs those who 
have a bachelor’s degree in humanities, and extensive professional 
experience improve the strength dimension of the firms. No 
significant relation is found between the characteristics of the CEO 
and the concern dimension. The author explains the findings by 
suggesting that CEOs may have more discretion in influencing strong 
and exemplary social performance than in impacting concern/poor 
CSP social performance. 
 Arguing that the term ‘diversity’ incorporates different notions 
Bear et al. (2010) contribute to the literature using the concept of 
resource diversity and gender diversity. They define resource diversity 
as unique characteristics that directors possess and gender diversity 
as gender composition of board. According to the authors, board of 
directors influence the reputation of a firm and CSR strengthens the 
association between board of directors and firm reputation. They 
argue that female directors improve firm reputation by improving 
firm’s CSR. To examine whether resource and gender diversity affect 
firms’ CSR rating (and in turn influences corporate reputation) they 
use resource dependency theory, agency theory and signalling theory. 
As a measure of positive CSR they develop two constructs: 
institutional and technical strength ratings1. Covering 51 firms from 
1 Institutional strength is the number of positive initiatives toward diversity and 
community whereas technical strength is the number of positive activities toward 
consumers, stockholders and employees. 
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Fortune 2009 “Most Admired List” and using OLS regression, they 
find that CSR strength rating is positively associated with firm 
reputation and mediate the association between female directors and 
corporate reputation. They also explain that when more females are 
appointed to the board, CSR performance of the firm increases, 
suggesting that the likelihood of their contributions to be considered 
by the board increases when the gender diversity moves away from 
tokenism to normative. 
With a sample of 100 companies listed in the Business Ethics 
100 “Best Corporate Citizens”, Mallin and Michelon (2011) empirically 
conduct a similar study using the strength dimension and overall 
CSP index. They argue that CSP is a function of board reputation, 
with the influence of board attributes on CSP giving a more complete 
picture when directors’ distinctive individual capabilities are 
considered. They find that female directors increase the firm’s overall 
social performance, community performance, employee relations and 
human rights. They therefore conclude that the social sensitivity of 
female directors and the interest consideration of stakeholders 
improve corporate legitimacy and social performance. 
Post et al. (2011) contribute to the literature by extending 
social responsibility to the environmental domain. For a sample of 78 
electronic and chemical firms from Fortune 1000 companies they find 
that higher representation of female directors results in more 
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involvement in positive environmental practices. They find no 
evidence that female directors influence negative environmental 
practices. They attribute their results to the fact that board 
composition might emphasize more on the strength dimension 
compared to the concern dimension. They do not leave the possibility 
that CEOs’ might have less discretion in improving the concern 
dimension. As their result explains the variance in strength rating, 
but not in the concern or overall KLD score, they criticize the use of 
additive/unidimensional method in previous studies for 
operationalizing CSP.  
 Similarly, for a sample of 475 Fortune 500 companies, Zhang 
(2012) finds no support for the negative relation between CSR 
concern rating and board gender. The author utilizes resource 
dependency and agency theory to examine how board demographic 
diversity is related to CSP. Institutional strength and concern rating 
(on diversity and community) and technical strength and concern 
rating (on corporate governance, employee relations and product) are 
considered. A significant positive relation between female directors 
and strength rating (both institutional and technical) is found, 
providing support for their proposition that board gender diversity 
stimulates institutional and technical strength rating of CSR. The 
author attributes the result to the fact that female directors’ valuable 
advice and networking ties develop strong connections with 
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stakeholders.  The author also raises the possibility that diverse 
board may be less efficient in addressing concern ratings. 
Female directors’ influence on CSP in the Post-SOX era is 
examined by Zhang et al. (2013), a time period when most public US 
corporations exhibited considerable presence of outside female 
directors on powerful board committees. They argue that female 
directors’ professional backgrounds and psychological character play 
unique roles in addressing stakeholders’ claims and in enhancing 
firms’ moral legitimacy. They consider only total CSP index. For a 
sample of 500 largest US firms from 64 industries, they find that the 
greater presence of outside and female directors is linked to better 
CSP. They conclude that outside and female directors effectively 
address stakeholders’ needs and help establish firms’ legitimacy 
among stakeholders which in turn leads to better CSP. 
Boulouta (2013) argues that previous studies that consider the 
link between CSP and board diversity mostly explain it from an 
agency theory or resource-based theory perspective, neither of which 
fully explain the effect of gender differences on CSP. So the study 
proposes social role theory- which the author argues provides a 
better explaination how the inherent characteristics of females affect 
multidimensional CSP. Positive CSP correlates more with doing good 
whereas negative CSP correlates more with harmful practices. 
Therefore, the author argues that negative CSP correlates more 
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strongly with ‘empathetic caring’ and can induce a more forceful 
empathetic response than the positive one. As female directors’ 
conventional behavior is caring, empathetic and socially sensitive, the 
author expects it will have a more significant impact on improving 
negative CSP than on enhancing positive CSP. Using a sample of 126 
S&P 500 firms and employing GMM estimator to address 
endogeneity, the author finds that female directors exert significant 
influence on the concern dimension of CSP. The study claims that it 
has revealed the hidden connection between gender diversity and 
CSP, suggesting that the concern dimension has the potential to 
induce higher level of empathetic response, therefore strongly 
appealing to female directors. 
In interpreting diversity, Hafsi and Turgut (2013) take a 
different perspective. They attempt to develop a better notion of 
diversity by arguing that the precise meaning of boardroom diversity 
is unclear as some studies relate it to the demographic differences 
among directors while others relate it to the disparities among boards 
in terms of structure, processes and other board characteristics. The 
authors distinguish diversity of boards (board independence, size, 
director stock ownership, and leadership duality) from diversity 
within boards (gender, ethnicity, age, experience, and tenure) and 
examine their impact on strength/positive dimension of CSP2. The 
diversity in boards estimates variances in director demographics 
2 To empirically measure this, the study constructs two indices for diversity of 
boards and the diversity in boards using the 9 variables. 
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within a given board and the diversity of boards is the variances in 
board structure among boards of different firms. For a sample of S&P 
500 firms operating in the manufacturing and service industries, they 
find that the diversity in boards shape firms’ positive social 
responsiveness and this relations is weakened by diversity of boards. 
They conclude that in firms which are beginners in social matters 
and unclear about possible actions, female directors’ social sensitivity 
and guidance may help make a difference in CSP. 
 Post et al. (2014) advance the literature on female directors and 
environmental CSP by examining the link between female board 
representation and firm strategy. According to the authors, the 
theoretical framework of the board composition–corporate 
environmental performance relations fails to model how board 
involvement in strategy mediates the ‘‘board composition-
environmental performance’’ relation. They propose that the 
formation of sustainability-themed alliances is a mechanism that 
links board composition to corporate environmental performance. 
They define sustainability-themed alliances as strategic alliances that 
are formed to mitigate internal resource needs or to facilitate external 
growth opportunities. They cover a sample of 36 US firms from the oil 
and gas industry and find that firms that have more female directors 
have a higher propensity to form sustainability-themed alliances. 
Further, the renewable energy alliance formation contributes to 
favourable corporate environment performance. While their study 
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suggests forming renewable energy alliances is a significant strategic 
move indicating a firm’s commitment to environmental performance, 
they conclude by emphasizing that other strategic initiatives (such as 
ISO 14001 certification, aligning internal business processes to 
reduce paper waste, reducing the amount of toxins in the 
environment) may also strengthen corporate environmental 
performance. 
2.4 Evidence from other Measures of CSP 
Some studies have focused on a particular aspect of CSP 
relying on other measures to estimate CSP. These studies are 
reviewed below. 
 The association between female directors and corporate 
philanthropy is evaluated by Wang and Coffey (1992) from an agency 
theory view. They argue that corporate philanthropy is an area in 
which principal and agents have contradictory views. They argue that 
female directors tend to have experience in non-profit organization 
which makes them more inclined to represent special interest groups. 
They consider a sample of 78 Fortune 500 firms and find a positive 
link between female directors and corporate philanthropy.  
A similar study is conducted by Williams (2003), where the 
author examines a large sample of 185 firms collected from Fortune 500 
firms. The author argues that financial performance plays a larger 
role in explaining philanthropic activities because during financially 
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lean years and economic downturns firms are less able to be involved 
in charitable actions. He also includes firm reputation as a 
controlling variable based on the premise that reputation encourages 
a firm to engage in philanthropic activities. He finds that a higher 
presence of females on the board is related with an improvement in 
corporate philanthropy in community services and arts, but not in 
education and public policy. The author refutes the idea that female 
directors are more inclined to use the firm’s profits to help others and 
are less concerned about the economic needs of the firm. The author 
explains that the underlying motives of females’ orientation toward 
charity can be attributed to the understanding that giving is a source 
of female empowerment.   
 Unlike the above studies that consider the association between 
female directors and corporate philanthropy, Marquis and Lee (2013) 
examine whether an organizations’ structural features constrain the 
board of directors action on corporate philanthropy. They argue that 
corporate philanthropy is a strategic action managed through a 
differentiated organizational arrangement, the corporate foundation. 
For a sample of Fortune 500 firms, they find that the presence of 
female senior managers and directors improves corporate 
philanthropic activities. They also find that organizational structure 
constrains the philanthropic influence of female directors, but not of 
female senior managers. They conclude that although a firm’s social 
performance is contingent on the judgment of powerful individuals, 
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the organizational structure can also be an influential tool to exploit 
strategic benefits. 
Arguing that the levels of scientific knowledge of gender across 
countries may explain their attitude towards nature and 
environmental protection, Hayes (2001) takes an international view to 
analyse gender attitudes towards nature and environmental 
protection. The author uses the ‘Knowledgeable Support Hypothesis’ 
and the ‘Nurturing Hypothesis’ to support the argument that female 
directors make a difference in social decision making. Using survey 
data the study finds that although there are gender differences in 
terms of scientific understanding, there is no evidence that 
differences in knowledge has an effect on the attitude towards the 
environment, nor that females care more about environmental issues 
than males. 
 Likewise, Galbreath (2010) undertakes a study on the influence 
of female directors in addressing climate change. The author argues 
that institutional pressures to address climate change appear to vary 
by country. He contributes to the literature by using an international 
sample and a comparable database (Ceres research-specialized 
secondary data). Considering 98 firms from 3 industries (energy, 
manufacturing and transport) across 10 countries, the author finds 
no evidence that female directors play a special role in addressing 
climate change. However, the author does acknowledge that the low 
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proportion of female directors in their sample might restrict their 
ability to influence policy addressing climate change. 
In another study, Galbreath (2011) simultaneously explores the 
link between female directors and three dimensions of sustainability- 
economic growth, environmental quality and social responsiveness. 
According to the author, strategic decision makers need to attain 
sustainability for competitive success. Arguing that a more gender 
diverse board influences corporate sustainability, the study considers 
the role of female directors on the three dimension of sustainability 
for a sample of top 200 Australian firms. Using content analysis of 
annual reports and hierarchical regressions, the study finds that 
though more females on the board is positively associated with 
economic growth and social responsiveness, no significant 
association is found between female directors and the environmental 
quality dimension of sustainability. They explain that gender bias 
may exist in the board room when environmental issues are 
concerned as male directors may ignore the view of female directors 
because of their work experience in the non-profit sector. 
  How the levels of gender diversity and their position on boards 
affect organizational performance when social performance is 
dominant is examined by Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2014). They 
undertake their study on the National Health Service Foundation 
Trusts (FTs) in the UK. FT’s is concerned with supplying excellence 
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services to communities while managing financial performance. Using 
multivariable regressions, they find that female directors improve 
firm performance. But the factor that plays significant role is the 
position held by the female on the board not the number of females.  
The proportion of female directors does not result in significant 
differences either in financial returns or service quality. They explain 
that in FT’s gender diversity has reached a level where the benefits of 
having more females cannot achieve further benefits in terms of 
performance. Moreover, they raise the possibility that social goal of 
FT’s may lead male directors to adopt ‘female’ roles. They also find 
that female chair or CEO reduces negative social practices, resulting 
in improved social performance. The authors attribute this to the fact 
that CEOs are considered mostly significant in exerting gender 
difference. Therefore, when females hold CEO position the likelihood 
of achieving the social goals of the business increases.  
2.5 Evidence from Social Disclosure Studies 
Barako & Brown (2008) examine the influence of gender on 
communication of corporate social reporting by Kenyan banks. In 
Kenya there is a lack of disclosure on employments, employee 
productivity and turnover. Corporate governance disclosure is not a 
main concern in those banks. Using multiple regression, they find 
that a higher proportion of female directors on the board greatly 
improves corporate social disclosure. 
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 Using a sample consisting of the largest 96 Australian firms, 
Kathy et al. (2012) confirm that female directors are effective in 
corporate disclosure. They argue that female directors contribute 
significantly to the environmental reporting because of their dynamic 
participation, skills in planning and independence. Using content 
analysis, they find that female directors on the board enhance 
environmental disclosure. They conclude that female directors play 
important role in addressing the need of wider stakeholders.  
In a similar vein, Frias‐Aceituno et al. (2013) examine the 
influence of board of directors on corporate social reporting in an 
international context. They argue that higher female representation at 
senior management level results in increased information 
transparency which positively influences company behavior. Covering 
a sample of 568 companies from 15 countries and employing Tobit 
regressions, they find that gender diversity plays a vital role in the 
integrated dissemination of information. Their result is independent 
of the historical and cultural features that define corporate 
governance systems in different countries. They explain that greater 
diversity brings greater range of information which helps to make 
dynamic decision and encourages voluntary provision of complete 
information which ultimately improves firms’ relation with 
stakeholders.  
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 Using a sample of 329 largest UK companies Liao et al. (2014) 
also examine how board characteristics influence the disclosure of 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). They undertake the study on the 
UK as innovative GHG legislations is introduced in the country which 
incentivised businesses to adopt carbon pollution protection 
measures. Since carbon emissions management is universal and 
long-term, they argue that management of carbon necessitates firm-
specific competences. They argue that females emphasis more on 
quality of life than professional achievement which provides a 
straight connection to environmental matters. Based on a sample of 
329 largest UK companies, they find that gender diverse boards 
increase the firms’ propensity to disclose GHG information. They 
explain that corporate climate policy is determined not only by 
corporate climate policy but also by interactions between the board of 
directors and stakeholders. Having a diverse board increases the 
likelihood to represent various interest groups and deal the tensions 
between financial and environmental decisions effectively. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
Prior research addresses the question of whether gender 
diverse board influences corporate social performance. A large part of 
the literature is based on surveys which do not consider the actual 
behavior of female directors on the board regarding social issues. The 
few studies that do consider female directors’ actual behavior focus 
only on particular aspects of CSP such as philanthropy, environment 
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or corporate social disclosure. The literature which uses 
multidimensional CSP using the KLD dataset, consider overall CSP 
whereas others split it into positive and negative dimensions. These 
literatures also provide mixed results. Moreover, previous studies 
rarely consider endogeneity which may strongly affect the estimation 
of the link between female directors and CSP. In sum, while empirical 
evidence on the association between the presence of female directors 
and CSP provides some understanding of how female directors 
address CSP, methodological weakness of small datasets, endogeneity 
problems, the use of a specific CSP measure and procedural 
weakness of treating multidimensional CSP cause some uncertainty 
of the effect of gender on CSP. 
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter develops the testable hypotheses. Using social role 
theory, Section 3.2 argues that females’ attachment to community 
and ethics drives female directors to place a higher emphasis on CSP. 
Due to gender differences in risk-aversion, Section 3.4 argues that 
female directors place more emphasis on negative CSP than on 
positive CSP.  Finally, Section 3.5 hypothesizes that the link between 
CSP and CFP is attenuated by female directors.  
3.2. Female Directors and CSP: Social Role Theory 
The literature offers several theories to explain gender 
differences in corporate social and environmental attitudes. Social 
role theory (Eagly, 1987, 2009) postulates that males and females 
play different roles in the society, and that there is a gender-based 
expectation according to the role they play. Females are thought to be 
more communal, i.e. unselfish, caring, and emotionally expressive, 
while males are thought to be agentic, i.e. competitive and dominant 
(Eagly, 2009). Others have similarly argued that females are relation 
and nurturing-oriented, while males are achievement-oriented 
(Hofstede, 1998). It is females’ distinct cultural involvement, 
reproductive roles, and closer ties to nature which explain why they 
are more benevolent or protective of both the environment and nature 
than males (Eagly, 2009). To bring about greater equality, females 
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emphasize values such as nurturing those who are less capable 
(Hofstede et al., 2002), and view charitable giving as a means to help 
the community as well as a way to express gratitude (Newman, 1996). 
Closely associated with this, females have been found to adopt a 
strong moral attitude (Weeks et al., 1999), encourage ethical 
environment (Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Lund, 2008) and tend to be 
whistleblowers (Vermeir and Van Kenhove 2008). 
Given females’ attachment to communal values and ethics, it is 
expected that female directors would better address multiple 
stakeholders’ interests and ensure sustainability of the company by 
undertaking CSP as a strategic device. Therefore, I predict the 
following: 
H1:  Firms with a higher proportion of female directors exhibit better 
social performance. 
3.3 Female Directors and CSP: Gender differences in Risk-
Aversion 
Investors may consider that firms lacking in social 
responsibility are riskier investments since management of the firms 
is not effective in addressing social demands (Alexander and 
Bucholtz, 1978). Poorer social performance increases the threats of 
deleterious stories, losses from lawsuits, divestment actions and 
boycotts that can negatively affect firms’ reputation (Mcguire, 1988; 
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Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). Thus, low CSP may increase a firm’s 
financial risk (Spicer, 1978; Ullman, 1985). 
I draw on psychology literature that sheds light on females’ 
orientation towards risk to argue that female directors consider CSP 
as a strategic device to reduce risk. The psychology literature finds 
females to be more risk averse and less inclined to participate in risky 
tasks (Levin et al., 1988). In experimental studies, females are more 
perceptive to risk, involve in less uncertain activities, and select 
options that involve less risk than males (Byrnes et al., 1999; Eckel 
and Grossman, 2008). A survey analysis shows that differences in 
perceived vulnerability to risk explain gender differences in 
environmental attitude (Bord and O'Çonnor, 1997). 
These arguments suggest that to reduce the risk and potential 
threat from uninsurable contingencies, female directors are likely to 
exhibit better conformance to social and environmental norms, 
voluntarily develop appropriate policy and encourage ethical 
behaviour. Therefore, I predict that female directors are more likely to 
reduce negative social practices. Thus: 
H2: Firms with a higher proportion of female directors exhibit less 
negative social performance. 
3.4 Female Directors and the association between CSP and CFP 
Firms’ profitability and social responsiveness are intrinsically 
tied to each other. Firms that undertake social initiatives may benefit 
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from increased employee morale and productivity (Moskowitz, 1972; 
Soloman and Hansen, 1985). However, arguably firms may face a 
trade-off between social and financial performance as actions taken 
to improve CSP add cost (Vance, 1975; Aupperle et al., 1985; Ullman, 
1985;). Alexander & Bucholtz (1978: 479) suggest that “Socially 
aware and Concerned management also possess the requisite skills to 
run a superior company in the traditional sense of financial 
performance, thus making its firm an attractive investment”. 
Hong and Minor (2015) argue that managers are less likely to 
make decisions in isolation and when they invest for CSR 
improvement they do not rule out the possible effects of CSR on firm 
value. Personal and firm interests are also important in allotting the 
costly resources along each dimension of performance (Reinhardt et 
al., 2008).  Thus, directors’ personal traits may play a vital role in 
considering the association between financial and social performance. 
Gender differences in the concept of money may help explain the way 
in which female directors can influence the CSP-CFP nexus.  
Yablonsky (1991: 25) defined “Money Style’’ as: “Everyone 
learns some means to acquire money and develops patterns for 
spending it. Your relation with money, your hows and whys of getting 
and spending, add up to your personal money style.”  Using the same 
definition of money style, Hallowell and Grace (1989) add that money 
style is embedded in emotional makeup and reflects personality. 
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Psychology studies show that money is the property which is most 
appealing to male possessiveness (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-
Halton, 1981). Men consider money as power whereas women value 
and identify with property that is connected to personal and 
communal dealings (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981; 
Dittmar 1989). Females view money a means of instant attainment of 
precious possessions, a facility for improving relations and a means 
of living a contented life (Dittmar, 1989). 
Galbreath (2011) suggests that the better the strategy-making 
experience in a specific area, the more that area is reflected in policy 
makers’ perceptions. Males are argued to show greater confidence in 
their money handling capabilities (Yablonsky, 1991) and tend to 
undertake greater risks to amass wealth (Prince, 1993). Male 
directors tend to have stronger backgrounds in the traditional 
business sectors, whereas female directors are likely to have greater 
experience in non-business and community-based organizations 
(Hillman, et al., 2002). Consistent with this, prior studies on the 
committee involvement of female directors show females are preferred 
in public affairs committees that set the direction of the firm’s 
corporate social responsibility whereas males are more preferred for 
membership in compensation, nominating, executive, and finance 
committees (Kesner, 1988; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Williams, 
2003). 
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 Considering females’ less profit-seeking behaviour and 
experience in non-profit organization, I argue that while allocating the 
resources on CSR initiatives female directors give less consideration 
to whether their allocation is going to add cost and counters to the 
firms’ traditional goal to maximize returns to shareholders. Thus, I 
predict the following: 
H3: Firms with a higher proportion of female directors weaken the 
association between CSP and CFP. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter developed the testable hypotheses of the thesis. 
Considering females’ attachment to nature along with that caring and 
protective view of environment, my first hypothesis argues that 
female directors improve CSP. In second hypothesis, given gender 
differences in risk aversion, I predict that female directors reduce 
negative social practices. In the third hypothesis, arguments for how 
female directors’ social orientation may translate into financial 
performance are developed. Since female directors are less focussed 
on profit, female directors’ investment in CSP is expected to reduce 
the correlation with financial returns.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the sample and the research method 
used to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. It begins with a 
discussion of data collection procedures and data sources in Section 
4.2. This is followed by research methodology in Section 4.3. Section 
4.4 describes the measurement of the variables used in the 
regressions. Descriptive statistics of the sample is provided in section 
4.5. A chapter summary is provided in Section 4.6. 
4.2 Data 
Our initial sample of KLD data consists of 20,475 firm-year 
observations of firms whose annual social performance has been 
assessed by Kinder Lyderberg Domini & Co., Inc (KLD) for the period 
1996-2013. KLD index is a common measure of CSP which is 
collected from the KLD’s SOCRATES database. Governance data 
including board size, board independence, the proportion of female 
directors, CEO duality, and board average age is collected from ISS 
database (formerly known as Risk Metrics). This database contains 
29,701 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2013. ISS specially 
focuses on several key governance datasets to help understand the 
key issues in the areas of board, audit, compensation, shareholder 
rights and more. The resulting sample is then matched with the 
COMPUSTAT Fundamental Annual database, which provides annual 
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and quarterly financial data for over 10,000 US firms dating back to 
the 1950s. I collect total asset, long-term debt, net income, R&D 
expense, and advertising expense from COMPUSTAT. The matching 
procedure results in a final sample of 9,097 firm-year observations, 
representing 1,540 unique U.S. firms spanning from 1996 to 2013. 
4.3 Research Method  
I use the following regression to test the association between 
the proportion of female directors and CSP: 
𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑡 + �𝛽𝑗𝑁
𝑗=1
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (1) 
where 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represent the intercept and residual term 
respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for potential 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and clustered by firm. To 
mitigate the influence of extreme values, all financial variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The dependent variable is 
corporate social performance (CSP), whilst the test variable is the 
proportion of female directors.  
        When analysing the association between female directors and 
CSP endogeneity concerns arise because of omitted unobservable firm 
characteristics (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). To address this concern 
that time-invariant firm characteristics is driving our results I include 
firm fixed effects in the regressions. Another concern is reverse 
causality as it is conceivable that socially responsible firms are more 
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likely to hire female directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Boulouta, 
2013). I address this problem by means of Two Stage Least Square 
(2SLS) approach. I hypothesize that state opportunity index and 
industry female labour force are valid instruments for the proportion 
of female directors. I discuss the economic logic behind the 
instruments in Chapter 5. 
 To test how female directors influence the CSP-CFP nexus, I 
run the following regression: 
𝐶𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽4(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑁𝑗=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (2)                                                                 
where 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represent the intercept and residual term 
respectively. CFP represents corporate financial performance. The 
interaction variable, Proportion of Female Directors × CSP, tests for 
whether females mitigate the association between CSP and CFP. 
Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation and clustered by firm. To address the omitted 
variable bias fixed effects panel regression is used. To address reverse 
causality, Two stage least square (2SLS) method is considered since 
financially successful firms might have more resources to spend on 
CSP. Religiosity rank and average CSP are considered as instruments 
for CSP as discussed in chapter 5. 
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4.4 Variable Measurement 
4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
Corporate social performance (CSP) is the dependent variable in 
the first regression. Since CSR is multidimensional, I measure it 
using scores obtained from the KLD database. Mirroring the 
multidimensional concept of CSP, KLD index focuses on seven areas 
of social performance. Following Mallin and Michelon (2010) and 
Zhang et al. (2012), I consider five measures of CSP: products; 
employee relations; human rights; community; and the environment. 
Since corporate governance and diversity mechanically relate to the 
main independent variable of my study, I exclude governance and 
diversity measures of CSP (Mallin, 2010; Manner, 2012; Boulouta, 
2013). 
Each KLD dimension has two sub dimensions of CSP: 
“strength” and “concern”. The “strength” dimension correlates more 
with “good” practices, while “concern” is related with “causing harm” 
practices (Boulouta, 2013). Each company scores 1 if it meets the 
strength/concern requirements and 0 otherwise.  
 Many studies treat KLD data by creating an overall CSP index 
by deducting concern from strength scores (Waddock and Graves, 
1997; Griffin and Mahon, 1997). According to these studies, strength 
and concern should be aggregated to get a complete picture of a 
firm’s CSR (Deckop et al., 2006). However, others suggest that by 
combining the two, much useful information will be lost (Laan et al., 
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2008; Post et al., 2011). Cumulative information fails to read whether 
a firm with a total CSP score of 0 is impartial on CSP or performs well 
on one part while entirely ignoring the other (Johnson and Greening, 
1999). Therefore, some scholars have split “strength” and “concern” 
dimensions (Van der Laan et al, 2008; Boulouta, 2013). I examine the 
aggregate measure of CSP as well as the “strength” and “concern” 
dimensions separately. Strength and Concern dimensions of CSP are 
respectively the sum of the number of “strength” and “concern” 
within the five areas of CSP. I also examine Total CSP, which is the 
difference between CSP Strength and Concern. 
 The dependent variable CFP in equation (2) is corporate 
financial performance, which I proxy using ROA which is an 
accounting-based measure, following Waddox and Graves (1997); 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Boulouta (2013). Measured market-
based proxy for CFP is Tobin’s Q, following Adams and Ferreira 
(2009). ROA is the ratio of net income to total asset and Tobin’s Q is 
the ratio of the firm’s market value to book value of equity. Market 
value is the book assets minus book equity plus market value of 
equity. 
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
The main test variable in my study is the Proportion of Female 
Directors, computed by the total number of female directors on the 
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board divided by board size, following previous studies (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Galbreath, 2011; Boulouta, 2013). 
Based on a review of previous literature, I control for a number 
of variables in the regressions. The size of the firm influences CSP. 
The argument is that smaller firms may not exhibit as much overt 
socially responsible behaviour as do larger firms because as they 
grow, firms draw more attention and need to react more responsively 
to stakeholder demands (Burke et al., 1986; Ullman, 1985; Waddox 
and Graves, 1997). The size of the firm (Firm Size) is also used as a 
control variable in the analysis of financial performance by many 
papers ( Fama and French, 1992; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter 
et al., 2010). Since larger firms normally have more market power, 
financial performance is expected to be positively related to firm size.  
I measure Firm Size by the natural logarithm of total assets. 
 Leverage is included as a measure of financial flexibility. 
Leverage is argued to improve firm value as debt is an efficient 
mechanism for reducing the agency conflict in the firm (Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008). However, as the level of debt increases, more 
resources are needed to pay financial costs with fewer resources 
available for community and social activities (Waddock and Graves, 
1997). I compute leverage as long-term debt to total asset ratio. 
The next control variable is R&D Intensity, which has been 
shown to be an important determinant of both firm financial and 
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social performance (Mcwilliam and Siegel, 2000). CSR and R&D 
investment are correlated as both lead to product and process 
innovation which enables firms to enhance their productivity 
(Mcwilliam and Siegel, 2000). In addition, advertising intensity (Adv 
Intensity) is included in the financial performance regression as a 
proxy of product differentiation and entry barriers that might serve to 
enhance firms’ profitability. Failure to incorporate R&D and 
advertising investment in estimating the association between 
financial and social performance may thus result in biased estimates 
of the financial impact of CSR (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). I 
measure R&D Intensity as the ratio of R&D expenses to total sales. 
Adv Intensity is measured as the ratio of advertising expense to total 
sales. 
Board Ownership is also related to financial and social 
performance, although there is debate on the exact nature of this 
relation. According to Monks and Minow (2004), a higher board 
ownership results in better monitoring. However, higher ownership 
may also result in an entrenched board that does not promote the 
interest of all stakeholders (Carter et al., 2010).  I measure Board 
Ownership by the percentages of shares owned by the directors on 
the board. 
Following prior literatures, I also control for Board 
Independence. Independent directors have the ability to better protect 
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stakeholders’ interests through improved monitoring (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2010). Studies also indicate that outside 
board members exhibit a greater concern for social responsibility 
than insiders (Wang and Coffey,1992; Wang and Dewhirst,1992; 
Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995). Board Independence is measured by 
the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Directors’ age is also associated with social awareness. 
Previous literatures argue that older individuals are more 
environmentally conscious (Forte, 2004). However, younger 
generations are also argued to have more knowledge of environmental 
issues (Klineberg et al., 1998; Diamantopoulos et al., 2003). As 
empirical evidence suggest that both old and young exhibit social 
orientation, age is included in our study as a control variable. Board 
Average Age is measured by the average age of all the directors on the 
board. 
Previous studies show that leadership structure of the firm has 
an effect on firm performance. According to Jensen (1993), separation 
between the CEO and chairman of the board position creates 
independence and increases the effectiveness of the board reducing 
agency problems between shareholders and managers. Brickley et al. 
(1997) argue that a combined CEO-chair position leads to lower 
market value but Adams and Ferreira (2005) find no evidence that 
CEO duality is related to stock returns. Webb (2004) argues that CEO 
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duality tend to be less prevalent in socially responsible firms 
compared to other firms. To account for these possibilities, I control 
for CEO Duality, a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the 
CEO and chair positions are combined, and zero otherwise. 
4.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 provides the average CSP score by industry. The 
Strength dimension of CSP is highest in Consumer Staples (1.87), 
followed by Materials (1.71), and the lowest in Financials (0.98). 
Utilities has the highest score (2.26) for Concern dimension of CSP 
followed by Energy (2.16) and the lowest score in Information 
Technology (0.46). Information Technology has highest average score 
of Total CSP (0.80) whilst Utilities has the lowest score (-0.90). 
Consumer Staples and Utilities sectors have the highest 
average proportion of female directors on the board (15%), whilst the 
Information Technology (7%) and Energy (6%) sectors have the lowest 
proportion of females on the board. Overall, the presence of female 
directors on board of US firms is low, at nearly 10% on average. 
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Table 4.1 Industry average CSP and the proportion of female 
directors (1996-2013) 
This table provides the industry average of CSP and proportion of female 
directors. The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 9,097 
observations from 1,540 firms for the period 1996-2013. CSP score is 
obtained from KLD database. Data on governance are obtained from ISS 
and financial information data is obtained from Compustat. Columns 1-3 
show average Total CSP, Strength and Concern dimensions of CSP for each 
industry. Strength is the sum of the number of “Strength” within five areas 
of CSP-(products, employees, human rights, community and environment). 
Concern is the sum of the number of “Concern” within five areas of CSP, and 
Total CSP is the difference between the Strength and Concern. Column 4 
shows industry average proportion of female directors. Proportion of Female 
Directors is the total number of female directors on the board divided by 
board size. 
 
   
  
GIC Sector Industry Total CSP Strength Concern Proportion of 
Female Directors
10 Energy -0.81 1.35 2.16 6%
15 Materials -0.34 1.71 2.05 11%
20 Industrial -0.13 1.18 1.30 9%
25 Consumer Discretionary -0.16 0.94 1.11 12%
30 Consumer Staples 0.16 1.87 1.72 15%
35 Health Care 0.07 1.00 0.93 11%
40 Financials 0.33 0.98 0.66 11%
45 Information Technology 0.80 1.26 0.46 7%
50 Telecommunication Services -0.12 1.35 1.47 11%
55 Utilities -0.90 1.55 2.45 15%
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Table 4.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the sample. 
The average size of the sample firms is USD 11,375 million. Firms 
have an average leverage of 18%, ranging from 0 to 79%. The average 
Tobin’s Q is 5.12 and the average ROA is 4%. The average R&D 
Intensity is 4.4%. The average corporate board is made up of 9 
members, of whom 68% are independent directors and 9% are 
females. In 47% of the firms, the position of CEO and chair of the 
board is combined. The mean age of the board of directors is 60 years 
and the average board ownership is 10%. The mean Total CSP score 
of our sample is -0.001 with a minimum score of -10 and a maximum 
score of 16.  The average scores of the Strength and Concern 
dimension of CSP are 1.16. 
Table 4.3 presents the Pearson correlation between the main 
variables of interest. As expected the correlations between our 
dependent variables, i.e. Total CSP and Strength and Concern are 
high. These latter two variables are also highly correlated to firm size 
and board size, as expected. The positive correlation between 
Proportion of Female Directors and Strength and Total CSP provide 
preliminary support for our hypothesis. The correlations between the 
independent variables are not high; therefore, do not raise concerns 
for multicollinearity in the regressions. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics (1996-2013) 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 9,097 observations from 1,540 
firms for the period 1996-2013. CSP score is obtained from KLD database. Data 
on governance are obtained from ISS and financial information data is obtained 
from Compustat. Firm Size is total assets; Leverage is long-term debt to total 
assets; ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets; Tobin’s Q is the ratio of 
market value of the firm (book assets minus book equity plus market value of 
equity) to book value of assets; R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense 
divided by net sales; Advertising Intensity is advertising expense divided by net 
sales; Board Size is the total number of directors on the board; Proportion of 
Female Directors is the total number of female directors on the board divided by 
board size; Board Independence is the ratio of outside (independent) directors 
divided by the board size; Board Average Age is the average age of all the 
directors on the board; CEO Duality equals one if the CEO and chair positions 
are combined and zero otherwise; Board Ownership is the percentages of shares 
owned by the board; Strength is the sum of the number of “Strength” within five 
areas of CSP-(product, employees, human rights, community and environment). 
Concern is the sum of the number of “Concern” within five areas of CSP, and 
Total CSP is the difference between the Strength and Concern. 
  
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm Size 11374.52 2093.20 32072.22 32.54 242082.00
Leverage 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.00 0.79
ROA 0.04 0.04 0.09 -0.42 0.29
Tobin's Q 5.12 3.79 4.56 -5.37 28.85
R&D Expense 126.00 0.00 613.44 0.00 12183.00
Advertising Expense 68.99 0.00 365.37 0.00 9729.00
R&D Intensity 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.60
Adv Intensity 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.14
Board Size 8.86 9.00 3.40 1.00 39.00
Proportion of Female Directors 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.00 1.00
Board Independence 0.68 0.73 0.22 0.00 1.00
Board Average Age 60.11 60.38 4.78 27.83 90.00
CEO Duality 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Board Ownership 0.10 0.02 0.21 0.00 0.90
Strength 1.16 0.00 1.85 0.00 18.00
Concern 1.16 1.00 1.72 0.00 14.00
Total CSP -0.001 0.00 2.05 -10.00 16.00
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Table 4.3 Correlation matrix 
This table reports Pearson correlation between the variables of interest. The sample consists of an unbalances panel of 
9097 observations from 1540 firms for the period 1996-2013. CSP score is obtained from KLD database. Data on 
governance are obtained from ISS and financial information data is obtained from Compustat. Firm Size is total asset of 
the firm. Leverage is long-term debt to total asset. ROA is the ratio of net income to total asset. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of 
the firm’s market value to its book value of asset. Market value of the firm is the book assets minus book equity plus 
market value of equity. R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided by net sales. Adv Intensity is advertising 
expense divided by net sales. Board Size is the total number of directors in a board. Proportion of Female Directors is the 
total number of females on board divided by board size. Board Independence is the ratio of the outsiders divided by board 
size. Board Average Age is the average age of all the directors on the firm. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one in a given year if the CEO and chair positions are combined and zero otherwise. Board Ownership is the 
percentages of shares owned by the board. Strength is measured by the sum of the number of “Strength” within five areas 
of CSP-(product, employees, human rights, community and environment). Concern is the sum of the number of “Concern” 
within five areas of CSP, and Total CSP is the difference between the Strength and Concern.
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Firm Size 1
Leverage 0.092 1
ROA 0.004 -0.228 1
Tobin's Q 0.106 0.172 0.149 1
R&D Intensity -0.045 -0.196 -0.206 0.025 1
Adv Intensity 0.042 -0.030 0.075 0.105 -0.018 1
Board Size 0.357 0.233 0.011 0.125 -0.199 0.041 1
Proportion of Female Directors 0.154 0.113 0.037 0.113 -0.119 0.108 0.273 1
 Board Independence 0.080 0.070 -0.005 0.005 0.007 -0.052 0.076 0.202 1
Board Average Age 0.071 0.010 0.027 -0.103 -0.100 -0.124 0.080 -0.059 0.153 1
CEO Duality 0.077 0.065 -0.005 0.009 -0.065 -0.034 0.018 0.063 0.123 0.030 1
Board Ownership -0.131 -0.064 -0.011 -0.069 -0.034 -0.007 -0.145 -0.056 -0.023 -0.009 -0.009 1
Strength 0.444 0.048 0.070 0.107 0.038 0.076 0.341 0.254 0.184 0.076 0.047 -0.141 1
Concern 0.559 0.170 -0.036 0.069 -0.135 -0.011 0.390 0.164 0.152 0.097 0.125 -0.136 0.371 1
Total CSP -0.099 -0.108 0.095 0.035 0.154 0.078 -0.040 0.082 0.029 -0.018 -0.069 -0.006 0.566 -0.556 1
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discusses the data, sample selection, variable 
measurements, and research method. It outlines the functional form 
to test the hypothesis and describes how the variables are calibrated. 
Data is collected from the secondary data sources: KLD database, ISS 
and Compustat with a sample of 1540 US firms from 1996 to 2013. 
The main independent variable of our study is the proportion of 
female directors on the board. The average proportion of female 
directors in our sample is low at 9%. To test the association between 
the proportion of female directors and CSP and how this association 
affects firm value, I employ panel regressions. Firm fixed effects and 
2SLS method are employed to address omitted variable bias and 
reverse causality respectively. 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical results. Section 5.2 
reports results from univariate tests. Section 5.3 discusses regression 
results on the association between the proportion of female directors 
and CSP. Regression results on how female directors influence the 
CSP-CFP nexus is reported in Section 5.4. A chapter summary is 
provided in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Univariate Analysis 
An initial test is conducted to see if differences exist between 
firms with female directors and those without, running a series of t-
test of differences in means. The results are reported in Table 5.1 
which compares the mean value of firm characteristics between firms 
with at least one female on the board and those with no female on the 
board. In line with Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Galbreath (2011), 
Panel A shows that firms that have females on the board are on 
average larger, more profitable and more leveraged. 
Panel B of Table 5.1 shows that firms that have female 
directors on board are more independent, consistent with the 
prevailing results in the literature (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Galbreath, 2011). CEO Duality is also more common in firms with 
female directors. 
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Panel C shows that firms with female directors score higher on 
Total CSP and the Strength dimension of CSP. This is consistent with 
my hypothesis which predicts that firms with a higher proportion of 
female directors exhibit better CSP. However, the results also show 
that firms with female directors have higher orientation toward 
negative social practices (Concern). I will address this issue further in 
the multiple regression section. 
In sum, these comparisons suggest that firms’ choices to 
nominate female directors could be influenced by firm characteristics. 
It shows the importance to control for these characteristics in our 
analysis. 
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Table 5.1 Univariate tests 
This table reports the means of various firm characteristics across firm years in 
which firms have at least one female director on the board and firm years 
without female directors. Firm Size is total asset of the firm. Leverage is long-
term debt to total asset. ROA is the ratio of net income to total asset. Tobin’s Q 
is the ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value of asset. Market value of 
the firm is the book assets minus book equity plus market value of equity. R&D 
Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided by net sales. Adv Intensity is 
advertising expense divided by net sales. Board Size is the total number of 
directors in a board. Proportion of Female Directors is the total number of 
females on board divided by board size. Board Independence is the ratio of the 
outsiders divided by board size. Board Average Age is the average age of all the 
directors on the firm. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a 
given year if the CEO and chair positions are combined and zero otherwise. 
Board Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the board. Strength is 
measured by the sum of the number of “Strength” within five areas of CSP 
(product, employees, human rights, community and environment). Concern is 
the sum of the number of “Concern” within five areas of CSP, and Total CSP is 
the difference between the Strength and Concern. Asterisks indicate significance 
at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Characteristics Mean for Firm-years                 
without Female 
Mean for Firm-years        
with Female 
Mean        
Difference
Panel A: Financial Characteristics
Firm Size 6.85 8.23 1.38*** 0.00
Leverage 0.17 0.19 0.03*** 0.00
ROA 0.04 0.05 0.01*** 0.00
Tobin's Q 4.38 5.50 1.12*** 0.00
R&D Intensity 0.06 0.03 -0.03*** 0.00
Adv Intensity 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.30
Panel B: Governance Characteristics
Board Size 6.72 10.26 3.54*** 0.00
Board Independence 0.60 0.73 0.13*** 0.00
Board Avg Age 59.00 60.00 0.66*** 0.00
CEO Duality 0.40 0.51 0.11*** 0.00
Board Ownership 0.13 0.08 -0.05*** 0.00
Panel C: CSP
Strength 0.50 1.41 0.918*** 0.00
Concern 0.62 1.37 0.751*** 0.00
Total CSP -0.12 0.05 0.167*** 0.00
P-value
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5.3 Regression results: Female Directors and CSP 
5.3.1 Ordinary Least Square Regression (OLS) 
Table 5.2 reports the results of panel regression on the 
association between CSP and the proportion of female directors. Each 
CSP measure is included separately in the regression with the set of 
control variables to test both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 in a 
multivariable setting. All specifications include year, industry and 
State fixed effects. The dependent variable in specifications 1, 2, and 
3 is Total CSP, Strength and the Concern dimensions of CSP 
respectively. 
Specification 1 tests the association between the proportion of 
female directors and the Total CSP index. The coefficient for the 
Proportion of Female Directors is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, indicating that the proportion of female directors on 
the board is positively correlated to Total CSP, controlling for the 
effects of other variables on CSP. In terms of economic significance, a 
one standard deviation increase in the proportion of female director is 
associated with a 0.244 (2.716 times 0.09) increase of Total CSP, 
hence confirming hypothesis 1. Since the average Total CSP index of 
the sample is -0.001, an average increase of 0.258 CSP is 
economically significant. 
Specification 2, which runs the regression for the Strength 
dimension, shows that the coefficient of the Proportion of Female 
Directors is positive and significant at the 1% level. Thus, the higher 
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the proportion of female directors the higher the positive CSP.  From 
an economic point, a one standard deviation increase in the 
proportion of female directors is associated with a 0.223 (2.518 times 
0.09) increase in the Strength dimension of CSP. 
 Specification 3 tests the association between the Proportion of 
Female Directors and the Concern dimension of CSP. The coefficient is 
negative but not statistically significant. Therefore, our regression 
results provide no evidence for our proposition that having more 
female directors reduces the Concern dimension of CSP. This result is 
consistent with previous studies (Post et al. (2011) and Zhang (2012). 
Looking at the control variables, there is a significant positive 
(p<0.01) relation between Board Independence and both the Strength 
and Concern dimensions of CSP. According to the literature, 
independent directors better protect stakeholders’ interests (Wang 
and Coffey, 1992; Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; Ibrahim and Angelidis, 
1995). The analysis shows that Board Independence is correlated 
with both higher Strength and Concern dimension of CSP. Perhaps, 
firms that experience more negative CSP employ more independent 
directors to address this concern. 
Likewise, Board Ownership is positively associated with the 
Concern dimension of CSP (p<0.01). However, the association 
between Board Ownership and the Strength dimension of CSP is 
insignificant. Therefore, the significant negative relation between 
Total CSP index and Board Ownership may be attributed to the 
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inclusion of the Concern dimensions in the Total CSP index. The same 
result is also found for CEO Duality. The coefficient on Board Average 
Age is insignificant in all specifications, providing no evidence that 
director age matters to CSP.  
Financial performance influences the financial capability to 
undertake costly programs related to social demands (McGuire et al. 
1988). Consistent with this idea, I find that ROA is significantly 
positively (p<0.01) related to the Strength dimension of Total CSP 
index. I also find that ROA is significantly negatively (p<0.01) related 
to the Concern dimension of CSP. Whilst not establishing causality, 
these results suggest that highly profitable firms undertake more 
positive social practices and less negative social practices. The 
significant positive coefficient of ROA in the Total CSP regression 
shows that highly profitable firms are associated with better CSP 
behaviour. In all columns the results are significant at the 1% level. 
 Firm Size, measured by log of total assets, has a statistically 
significant positive relation (p<0.01) with the Strength dimension of 
CSP. This is consistent with the argument that as firms grow, they 
draw more attention and need to react more amenably to stakeholder 
demands (Burke et al., 1986). However, column 3 shows that firm 
size is also significantly positively related to Concern dimension of 
CSP. Hence, our result shows that bigger firms are associated with 
both higher positive and negative social practices. Perhaps this may 
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be due to the fact that such firms attract higher investor and media 
scrutiny. 
As the level of debt increases firms undertake fewer social 
programs as more resources are needed to pay financial costs 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008). 
Consistent with the arguments, I find that higher level of debt 
significantly (p<0.10) reduces Total CSP of the firm. Looking at the 
sub dimensions of CSP, while higher debt levels are associated with 
less positive social practices (Strength), they do discourage negative 
social practices (Concern) of the firm. The results are significant at 
the 1% level. 
Consistent with the idea that firms with higher R&D spending 
have greater capacity to innovate and develop new products that 
satisfy emerging customer needs (Mizik and Jacobson, 2003), I find  a 
statistically significant (p<0.01) and positive relation of R&D Intensity 
with both the Total CSP and the Strength dimension of CSP. The 
relation between R&D intensity and the Concern dimension of CSP is 
negative and significant. These results tentatively suggest that 
innovation improves the positive social practices and at the same 
time discourages the negative social practices of the firm. 
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Table 5.2 Panel regression of female directors and CSP 
The dependent variables in column 1, 2 and 3 are Total CSP, Strength and 
Concerns which are calculated from the score obtained from KLD database. 
Strength is measured by the sum of the number of “Strength” within five 
areas of CSP-(product, employees, human rights, community and 
environment). Concern is the sum of the number of “Concern” within five 
areas of CSP, and Total CSP is the difference between the Strength and 
Concern. Proportion of Female Directors is the total number of females on 
board divided by board size. Board Independence is the ratio of the 
outsiders divided by board size. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one in a given year if the CEO and chair positions are combined 
and zero otherwise. Board Average Age is the average age of all the directors 
on the firm. Board Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the 
board. ROA is net profit divided by total asset. Firm Size is total asset of the 
firm. Leverage is long-term debt to total asset. R&D Intensity is measured 
by R&D expense divided by net sales. All specifications include year, 
industry and state dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for potential 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are clustered by firm.  
Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0. 1 (*) level. 
Total CSP        
(1)
Strength     
(2)
Concern     
(3)
Proportion of Female Directors 2.716*** 2.518*** -0.198
(6.413) (7.624) (-0.654)
Board Independence -0.235 0.506*** 0.741***
(-1.008) (2.779) (3.781)
CEO Duality -0.102* -0.0195 0.0823*
(-1.647) (-0.397) (1.906)
Board Average Age -0.0122 -0.00924 0.00294
(-1.394) (-1.293) (0.440)
Board Ownership -0.225** 0.0546 0.280***
(-2.542) (0.702) (3.790)
ROA 2.531*** 1.186*** -1.345***
(6.755) (3.496) (-5.046)
Firm Size -0.0422 0.645*** 0.687***
(-0.959) (17.64) (17.58)
Leverage -0.405 -1.218*** -0.813***
(-1.602) (-5.746) (-4.338)
R&D Intensity 3.026*** 1.502*** -1.525***
(5.894) (3.472) (-3.912)
Constant -3.533*** -3.418*** 0.116
(-3.259) (-5.683) (0.0931)
Observations 9,404 9,404 9,404
R-squared 0.227 0.389 0.487
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes
State Effect Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No
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5.3.2 Endogeneity concerns 
Studies on gender diversity and social and environmental 
performance rarely consider the endogeneity issue.3 Reverse causality 
is a major concern in the regressions since appointments of female 
directors may not be random but could be simultaneously 
determined (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Francis et al., 2013, 2015; 
Faccio et al., 2016); socially responsible firms may be more likely to 
hire female directors. I approach this issue by means of the 
instrumental variables (IV) method. Thus, I need an instrument that 
is correlated with the proportion of female directors but not directly 
related to our dependent variable, except indirectly through other 
variables. My approach is to find a variable that previous literature 
has not been considered as an explanatory variable for my dependent 
variable. 
 I use opportunities available in the state where the firm 
operates as an instrument for the presence of female directors on 
board. As noted in the Report on the World Social Situation 2005, 
education, health, economic opportunities are three areas recognized 
as critical for women’s effective participation in development and to 
boost women’s participation in the labour force. Though it cannot 
guarantee equal treatment for women, it can create an even playing 
field in which women have the opportunity to thrive. This suggests 
that an enabling environment would influence the capacity of women 
3 Boulota (2013) uses Arrellano and Bond’s difference generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) to address endogeneity. 
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to be involved. This idea is the basis for the instrument. Across 
America, there is variation in the basic measures of opportunity. I 
use the opportunity index, jointly developed by Opportunity Nation 
and Measure of America 
(http://www.measureofamerica.org/opportunityindex) which 
provides a snapshot of what opportunity looks like at the state level. 
Opportunity Index encompasses a range of circumstances that open 
doors to economic mobility and human progress. The indicators that 
make up the index are grouped into three main dimensions: Jobs and 
Local Economy, Education and Community Health and Civic Life. I 
expect that an enabling environment would influence the capacity of 
women to participate actively and benefit from development processes 
in a sustained and effective manner. Therefore, this instrument is 
expected to be correlated with the suspect endogenous variable. 
I also use industry female labor force data, collected from US 
labor statistics (http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat17.htm), as a 
measure of industry expectation or pressure for adding females on 
the board. Industry factors have been shown to influence the 
representation of females on corporate boards (Harrigan, 1981; 
Frywell and Lerner, 1989; Farrel and Hersch, 2005). Firms with lower 
female representation may aggressively attempt to add women to 
their boards when the industry to which it belongs shows greater 
female presence. Therefore, the likelihood of a female being added to 
a board might be higher when the existing representation by female 
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in the industry is high. I expect that industry female representation is 
correlated with female directors but uncorrelated with CSP. 
A valid instrument must satisfy the first and second conditions 
for an instrument, i.e., it should be correlated with the endogenous 
variable and uncorrelated with the dependent variable except 
indirectly through other variables included in the regression. The 
strength of the instruments is evident from the regression results 
reported in Table 5.3. From the first-stage regressions (reported in 
the first column), it is evident that opportunity index and female 
industry representation are correlated and strong predictors (1% and 
10% significant respectively) of female board representation. 
Moreover, the partial F-statistic (29.58>10) shows that the 
instruments are statistically significant in determining the proportion 
of female directors. I also carry out Sargan (1958) over-identifying 
restriction tests to assess the validity of the instruments. The p 
values of the test of over-identifying restrictions are 0.72, 0.69 and 
0.52 for Total CSP, Strength and Concern regression respectively. The 
tests fail to reject the joint exogeneity of the instruments. Therefore, I 
find no evidence against the validity of the instruments. 
The dependent variable in specifications 1, 2, and 3 is the Total 
CSP, Strength, and Concern dimensions of CSP respectively. In 
columns 4-6, I replicate the regressions including firm fixed effects. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.3 show that the greater presence of 
female directors on the board is positively related to the Total CSP 
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index and Strength dimension of Total CSP index. Column 3 shows a 
negative relation with Concern dimension, however, the result is 
statistically insignificant. Thus our results are robust to suspect 
reverse causality. 
When firm fixed effects is considered the coefficient on the 
proportion of female directors remains statistically significant in 
columns 4 and 5 for Total CSP index and the Strength dimension of 
CSP index respectively. In column 6, the sign remains insignificant. 
Thus, omitted correlated variables do not appear to drive the results. 
I find that CEO Duality, Board Ownership and Leverage are no 
longer significant when firm fixed effects are considered. Board 
Independence is now significantly (p<0.10) negatively associated with 
Total CSP and Strength dimension of CSP which decreases Total CSP 
in column 5. Moreover, Board Average Age is now positively related 
with the Strength dimension of CSP. R&D Intensity is significantly 
positively related to the Strength dimension of CSP only. 
In sum, Table 5.3 shows that the positive relation between the 
Proportion of Female Directors, Total CSP and the Strength dimension 
of CSP index is statistically and economically significant and robust 
to firm fixed effects and reverse causality. The Proportion of Female 
Directors is negatively related to the Concern dimension of CSP, 
though it is not statistically significant in any specification. These are 
in line with previous studies such as Post et al. (2011) and Zhang 
(2012) but are in contrast to Boulouta (2013). 
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Table 5.3 Two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
Dependent variable in in column 1 is proportion of female directors and it reports 
first stage of an instrumental variable regression with opportunity index and 
industry female labor force as instruments for the proportion of female directors. 
Dependent variables in columns 2-4 are Total CSP, Strength and Concerns which 
are calculated from the score obtained from KLD database. The specifications in 
columns 5-7 include firm fixed effects. Strength is measured by the sum of the 
number of “Strength” within five areas of CSP-(product, employees, human rights, 
community and environment). Concern is the sum of the number of “Concern” 
within five areas of CSP, and Total CSP is the difference between the Strength and 
Concern. Proportion of Female Directors is the total number of females on board 
divided by board size. Board Independence is the ratio of the outsiders divided by 
board size. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a given year if 
the CEO and chair positions are combined and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of 
net income to total asset. Board Average Age is the average age of all the directors 
on the firm. Board Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the board. 
ROA is net profit divided by total asset. Firm Size is total asset of the firm. Leverage 
is long-term debt to total asset. R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided 
by net sales. All specifications include year and state dummies. Standard errors are 
adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are 
clustered by firm.  Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 
(*) level.  
Proportion of 
Female Directors
Total CSP        
(1)    
Strength
(2)
Concern 
(3)
Total CSP 
(4)
Strength 
(5)
Concern 
(6)
Opportunity Index 0.00156***
(4.700)
Female Industry Labor force 0.00690*
(1.905)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 10.38*** 8.302** -1.451 30.70* 31.41** 0.716
(2.616) (2.562) (-0.448) (1.669) (2.127) (0.0595)
Board Independence 0.0706*** -0.787** -0.217 0.427 -2.067* -2.028** 0.0382
(8.718) (-2.259) (-0.752) (1.534) (-1.700) (-2.078) (0.0480)
CEO Duality 0.00128 -0.0411 0.00756 0.0416 -0.00938 0.00943 0.0188
(0.658) (-0.781) (0.178) (1.241) (-0.176) (0.220) (0.540)
Board Avgage Age -0.00302*** 0.0195 0.0167 4.61e-05 0.0964 0.105** 0.00885
(-7.547) (1.365) (1.392) (0.00422) (1.547) (2.104) (0.217)
Board Ownership 0.00293 -0.126** 0.0342 0.139*** -0.141 -0.0370 0.104
(1.168) (-1.984) (0.638) (2.809) (-1.291) (-0.423) (1.455)
ROA -0.0103 1.368*** 0.428* -0.878*** 1.174*** 0.577** -0.598***
(-1.014) (5.043) (1.900) (-4.618) (3.397) (2.078) (-2.645)
Firm Size 0.0105*** -0.126** 0.482*** 0.565*** -0.325*** 0.0206 0.346***
(7.147) (-2.164) (10.94) (11.63) (-5.062) (0.399) (8.233)
Leverage 0.0138* -0.185 -0.513*** -0.181 -0.263 -0.161 0.102
(1.656) (-0.953) (-2.978) (-1.312) (-0.688) (-0.524) (0.409)
R&D Intensity -0.0514*** 2.440*** 1.356*** -0.865*** 1.598 2.059** 0.461
(-3.866) (5.732) (3.521) (-2.577) (1.488) (2.388) (0.656)
Constant 0.0673 -4.051*** -3.340*** 0.689 -4.884 -6.487** -1.603
(1.227) (-2.934) (-3.938) (0.365) (-1.242) (-2.055) (-0.624)
Observations 11,607 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097
R-squared 0.265 0.205 0.362 0.476 0.209 0.216 0.239
Partial F-statistics 29.58
Sargan test (p value) 0.722 0.688 0.522 0.674 0.902 0.451
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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5.3.3 Robustness check-Stakeholder’s heterogeneity 
Given that the previous findings suggest that the proportion of 
female directors has a strong influence on positive CSP, it is 
interesting to examine how female directors address the demand of 
each corporate stakeholder group: Community, Employee, 
Environment, Human Rights and Product performance (see Appendix 
B for a detailed list of KLD items). Therefore, the association between 
the proportion of female directors and each dimension of Strength, 
Concern and Total CSP is reported in this section using 2SLS. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 report the association between the 
Proportion of Female Directors and each dimension of Strength and 
Concern respectively. Table 5.6 reports the association between the 
proportions of female directors and each dimension of Total CSP. In 
each table, columns 1-5 report CSP measures including Community, 
Employee, Environment, Human Rights and Product performance 
respectively. In columns 6-10 of each table, I replicate the regressions 
including firm fixed effects. 
 Column 1 of Table 5.4 shows that, the Proportion of Female 
Directors is significantly positively related to the Strength dimension 
of Community (p<0.01), suggesting that female directors improve the 
association of the firm with the community. The result is robust to 
firm fixed effects. A significant and positive relation is also found 
between the proportion of female directors and Human Rights 
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performance after inclusion of firm fixed effects (p<0.01). The 
coefficients for Employee, Environment and Product are insignificant. 
 Table 5.5 presents the association between the proportion of 
female directors and the Concern dimension of CSP for each 
stakeholder. The coefficient of the Proportion of Female Directors is 
insignificant for all measures of the Concern dimension. 
Table 5.6 shows that the Proportion of Female Directors 
improves Total CSP measured as the association with Community. 
The result is robust to firm-fixed effects. As the coefficient is 
significant in Strength model but not in Concern model, the positive 
relation between the Proportion of Female Directors and total 
community CSP may be attributed to the inclusion of Strength 
dimension.  
Hence, female directors improve the association with 
Community by undertaking more positive community programs. They 
also take positive actions to improve Human Rights performance. 
However, no significant relation is found between the Proportion of 
Female Directors and any measures of Concern CSP.  
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Table 5.4 2SLS estimation of the Strength dimension of CSP (for each stakeholder) 
Dependent variables in columns1-5 are multidimensional measures of positive CSP: community, employee relations, environmental, human 
rights and product quality performance respectively which are collected from the score obtained from KLD database. The specifications in 
columns 6-10 include firm fixed effects. Proportion of Female Directors is the total number of females on board divided by board size. Board 
Independence is the ratio of the outsiders divided by board size. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a given year if the 
CEO and chair positions are combined and zero otherwise. Board Average Age is the average age of all the directors on the firm. Board 
Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the board. ROA is net profit divided by total asset. Firm Size is total asset of the firm. 
Leverage is long-term debt to total asset. R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided by net sales. Advertising intensity is advertising 
expense divided by net sales. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are clustered by 
firm. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level. 
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee EnvironmentHuman Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 3.629*** 1.450 1.603 -0.174 1.263* 13.38*** 7.570 3.142 5.925*** 1.394
(3.154) (0.900) (1.165) (-0.649) (1.749) (2.764) (0.911) (0.437) (3.584) (0.413)
Board Independence -0.180* 0.0215 0.0808 0.0131 -0.0820 -0.878*** -0.512 -0.120 -0.390*** -0.129
(-1.940) (0.154) (0.710) (0.632) (-1.273) (-2.744) (-0.931) (-0.252) (-3.568) (-0.578)
CEO Duality -0.0145 -0.0148 0.0410** -0.00402 -0.0121 -0.0351** 0.000343 0.0677*** -0.0130*** -0.0105
(-1.179) (-0.669) (2.315) (-1.093) (-1.296) (-2.499) (0.0143) (3.247) (-2.718) (-1.074)
Board Average Age 0.0113*** 0.00157 -0.00242 -0.000584 0.00464* 0.0480*** 0.0262 0.00427 0.0189*** 0.00793
(2.956) (0.259) (-0.490) (-0.890) (1.824) (2.924) (0.930) (0.175) (3.374) (0.693)
Board Ownership 0.00804 0.0248 0.0176 0.00549 -0.0178 -0.0357 0.0136 0.0205 -0.0182* -0.0172
(0.517) (0.841) (0.675) (1.191) (-1.372) (-1.244) (0.276) (0.481) (-1.859) (-0.862)
ROA 0.00248 0.336*** 0.0661 0.00185 0.0834 0.0464 0.227 0.181 0.0341 0.0886
(0.0346) (2.699) (0.646) (0.0993) (1.601) (0.510) (1.451) (1.338) (1.099) (1.397)
Firm Size 0.0958*** 0.179*** 0.191*** 0.0157*** 0.0328*** 0.0178 0.0328 -0.0463* 0.0134** 0.00292
(6.253) (8.261) (10.63) (3.729) (3.820) (1.054) (1.128) (-1.844) (2.322) (0.248)
Leverage -0.199*** -0.246*** -0.135* -0.0413*** -0.0223 -0.187* -0.128 0.222 -0.145*** 0.0773
(-3.841) (-2.903) (-1.863) (-3.333) (-0.603) (-1.858) (-0.741) (1.482) (-4.209) (1.100)
R&D Intensity 0.304*** 0.825*** 0.00542 0.00271 0.136* 0.679** 0.513 0.560 0.270*** 0.0363
(2.643) (4.068) (0.0365) (0.161) (1.689) (2.402) (1.057) (1.335) (2.797) (0.184)
Constant -1.238*** -0.525 -1.139*** 0.0502 -0.561*** -3.022*** -1.620 -0.159 -1.225*** -0.462
(-5.434) (-0.936) (-4.206) (1.234) (-3.837) (-2.919) (-0.911) (-0.103) (-3.465) (-0.640)
Observations 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097
R-squared 0.236 0.223 0.324 0.081 0.116 0.061 0.118 0.271 0.048 0.028
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5.5 2SLS estimation of the Concern dimension of CSP (for each stakeholder) 
Dependent variables in columns 1-5 are multidimensional measures of negative CSP: community, employee relations, environmental, human 
rights and product quality performance respectively which are collected from the score obtained from KLD database. The specifications in 
columns 6-10 include firm fixed effects. Proportion of Female Directors is the total number of females on board divided by board size. Board 
Independence is the ratio of the outsiders divided by board size. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a given year if the 
CEO and chair positions are combined and zero otherwise. Board Average Age is the average age of all the directors on the firm. Board 
Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the board. ROA is net profit divided by total asset. Firm Size is total asset of the firm. 
Leverage is long-term debt to total asset. R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided by net sales. Standard errors are adjusted for 
potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are clustered by firm. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 
0.1 (*) level. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors -0.983 -0.198 -0.821 0.219 0.0650 1.433 -1.466 1.284 1.423 -1.959
(-1.530) (-0.155) (-0.541) (0.392) (0.0532) (0.473) (-0.219) (0.238) (0.510) (-0.380)
Board Independence 0.110** 0.168 0.161 -0.0411 0.0982 -0.101 0.196 -0.0718 -0.154 0.168
(1.987) (1.444) (1.265) (-0.782) (0.928) (-0.503) (0.444) (-0.201) (-0.836) (0.494)
CEO Duality 0.0101 0.0482*** 0.0184 -0.0174** -0.0180 0.00397 0.0603*** 0.00386 -0.0286*** -0.0207
(1.321) (2.697) (1.117) (-2.222) (-1.225) (0.452) (3.108) (0.247) (-3.542) (-1.383)
Board Average Age -0.00144 -0.00391 0.00141 0.00243 0.00126 0.00719 -0.0107 0.00955 0.00679 -0.00397
(-0.665) (-0.849) (0.273) (1.263) (0.286) (0.702) (-0.472) (0.523) (0.718) (-0.227)
Board Ownership 0.0331*** 0.0326 0.0631*** 0.00145 0.0221 0.0133 0.0395 0.0429 -0.00827 0.0161
(3.001) (1.154) (2.954) (0.158) (1.281) (0.743) (0.997) (1.344) (-0.501) (0.527)
ROA -0.0513 -0.595*** -0.197*** 0.0248 -0.122 0.00535 -0.444*** -0.0890 0.0607 -0.131
(-1.280) (-5.922) (-2.626) (0.548) (-1.482) (0.0941) (-3.526) (-0.878) (1.157) (-1.350)
Firm Size 0.0657*** 0.132*** 0.183*** 0.0511*** 0.167*** 0.0137 0.0489** 0.168*** 0.0314*** 0.0838***
(7.371) (7.746) (8.316) (5.949) (9.362) (1.298) (2.089) (8.923) (3.216) (4.647)
Leverage -0.0147 -0.0382 -0.116* -0.0892*** -0.0479 -0.00901 0.190 -0.104 -0.0769 0.103
(-0.471) (-0.549) (-1.842) (-3.107) (-0.804) (-0.143) (1.360) (-0.930) (-1.325) (0.961)
R&D Intensity -0.103 -0.347** -0.512*** -0.0261 -0.0167 0.245 -0.136 0.0529 0.0816 0.217
(-1.471) (-2.509) (-3.517) (-0.507) (-0.117) (1.388) (-0.349) (0.168) (0.501) (0.721)
Constant 0.0319 -0.219 0.312 -0.213 0.569 -0.562 0.593 -1.489 -0.542 0.396
(0.119) (-0.598) (0.304) (-1.116) (0.820) (-0.868) (0.414) (-1.291) (-0.908) (0.359)
Observations 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097
R-squared 0.232 0.254 0.412 0.221 0.325 0.064 0.188 0.073 0.051 0.066
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5.6 2SLS estimation of Total CSP (for each stakeholder) 
Dependent variables in column 1-5 are multidimensional measures of Total CSP for each stakeholder: community, employee relations, 
environmental, human rights and product quality performance respectively which are collected from the score obtained from KLD database. 
The specifications in columns 6-10 include firm fixed effects. Proportion of Female Directors is the total number of females on board divided by 
board size. Board Independence is the ratio of the outsiders divided by board size. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a 
given year if the CEO and chair positions are combined and zero otherwise. Board Average Age is the average age of all the directors on the 
firm. Board Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the board. ROA is net profit divided by total asset. Firm Size is total asset of the 
firm. Leverage is long-term debt to total asset. R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided by net sales. Standard errors are adjusted 
for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are clustered by firm. Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) 
and 0.1 (*) level. 
 Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 4.470*** 1.616 2.971 -0.0228 1.146 11.95** 9.036 1.858 4.501 3.353
(3.672) (0.818) (1.578) (-0.0433) (0.821) (2.101) (0.860) (0.212) (1.367) (0.547)
Board Independence -0.268*** -0.138 -0.208 0.0153 -0.183 -0.778** -0.708 -0.0478 -0.236 -0.297
(-2.693) (-0.803) (-1.303) (0.298) (-1.496) (-2.069) (-1.019) (-0.0824) (-1.084) (-0.734)
CEO Duality -0.0234* -0.0643** 0.0206 0.00884 0.00641 -0.0390** -0.0600** 0.0638** 0.0156 0.0102
(-1.654) (-2.175) (0.859) (1.075) (0.385) (-2.369) (-1.968) (2.511) (1.638) (0.572)
Board Average Age 0.0120*** 0.00546 -0.000792 -0.00203 0.00354 0.0408** 0.0369 -0.00527 0.0121 0.0119
(2.885) (0.746) (-0.118) (-1.057) (0.710) (2.117) (1.037) (-0.177) (1.086) (0.573)
Board Ownership -0.0202 -0.00765 -0.0586* -0.00366 -0.0400** -0.0490 -0.0259 -0.0224 -0.00993 -0.0333
(-1.136) (-0.190) (-1.818) (-0.353) (-1.962) (-1.455) (-0.416) (-0.432) (-0.509) (-0.918)
ROA 0.0666 0.927*** 0.312** -0.0332 0.200** 0.0410 0.670*** 0.270 -0.0265 0.220*
(0.930) (5.926) (2.541) (-0.783) (2.164) (0.384) (3.393) (1.637) (-0.429) (1.905)
Firm Size 0.0370** 0.0493* -0.0235 -0.0424*** -0.137*** 0.00411 -0.0161 -0.214*** -0.0179 -0.0808***
(2.260) (1.843) (-0.900) (-5.519) (-7.076) (0.207) (-0.438) (-6.999) (-1.560) (-3.773)
Leverage -0.209*** -0.222** 0.109 0.0623** 0.0451 -0.178 -0.318 0.326* -0.0678 -0.0258
(-3.580) (-2.095) (1.171) (2.113) (0.665) (-1.506) (-1.452) (1.787) (-0.990) (-0.202)
R&D Intensity 0.400*** 1.165*** 0.782*** 0.0490 0.152 0.434 0.649 0.508 0.188 -0.181
(3.175) (4.842) (4.300) (0.979) (1.006) (1.307) (1.058) (0.991) (0.980) (-0.505)
Constant -1.262*** -0.338 -1.562 0.225 -1.119 -2.461** -2.213 1.330 -0.683 -0.858
(-4.225) (-0.409) (-1.587) (1.372) (-1.554) (-2.024) (-0.984) (0.709) (-0.970) (-0.654)
Observations 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097
R-squared 0.142 0.172 0.199 0.162 0.213 0.058 0.149 0.194 0.056 0.057
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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5.3.4 Robustness check-Female directors and CSP in a more 
litigious environment 
Our previous findings suggest that female directors improve 
CSP and the impact is mostly attributed to the Strength dimension of 
CSP. I find little evidence of a relation exists between female directors 
and the Concern dimension of CSP. I hypothesize that female 
directors have more influence on reducing negative CSP compare to 
the positive one as they are more risks averse. Therefore, it might be 
interesting to examine whether risky business environment induces 
female directors to reduce negative CSP. In other words, in a 
situation where risk/threats dominate the business environment, 
female directors might respond to the risk by exerting more influence 
on negative CSP. 
I use litigious industry as a measure of ‘risky environment’ 
following others (Francis et al., 1994; Goh and Li., 2011; Bentley et 
al., 2013; Gong et al., 2013). I use the following SIC codes to 
represent litigious industries: 2833–2836 (biotechnology), 3570–3577 
(computer equipment), 3600–3674 (electronics), 5200–5961 
(retailing), and 7370–7374 (computer services). The reason for 
considering litigation risk is that low CSP increases the risks of 
negative news stories and other communications, of loss from 
lawsuits, divestment actions and boycotts that have the potential to 
create long-term damage to a company’s reputation with the key 
stakeholders (Mcguire, 1988; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009). Investors 
may consider firms’ lacking in CSP as riskier investments since 
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management of the firms is not effective in addressing social demand 
(Alexander and Bucholtz, 1978). Therefore, low CSP may increase a 
firm’s financial risk (Spicer, 1978; Ullman, 1985). 
 I create a dummy variable ‘litigation risk’ which is assigned the 
value of one if the company is operating in a litigious industry and 
zero otherwise. I then run 2SLS regressions after including two new 
variables: litigation risk and the product of the instrumented female 
directors and litigation risk. I do not include firm fixed effects as this 
would make our litigation risk variable redundant. The results are 
reported in Table 5.7. In columns 1-3, I first report Total CSP, 
Strength and Concern regressions that include the litigation risk 
dummy. In columns 4-6, I include the interaction variable between 
litigation risk dummy and instrumented proportion of female 
directors. 
 In columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on litigation risk is positive 
and significant, suggesting that the risky environment of litigious 
industry induces firms to significantly undertake more positive social 
practices which improve Total CSP. Column 3 shows no significant 
result between Concern and litigation risk.  
When the interaction variable is included in columns 4-6, the 
coefficient of the interaction variable (Proportion of Female Directors * 
litigation risk) is significant in the positive CSP regression but not in 
the negative CSP regression. This suggests that in firms confronting 
greater litigation risk, the proportion of female directors may have 
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less discretion in addressing the Concern dimension. Therefore, to 
ensure stable relation with investors and other constituents, female 
directors respond by adopting more positive social practices 
(Strength). 
I do not find any evidence of a significant relation between the 
Proportion of Female Directors and Concern dimension of CSP even 
after considering the litigation risk. This suggests that female 
directors may have less discretion in addressing the Concern 
dimension. Since the Concern dimension of CSP is considered a risky 
strategy, female directors might encounter resistance in decision-
making processes that could limit their influence on this issue. Sex-
based bias or gender stereotyping may exist in the boardroom 
(Bilimoria et al., 1994; Hefferman, 2002; Galbreath, 2011) inhibiting 
female directors’ voice on this issue.   
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Table 5.7 2SLS estimation (with Litigation Risk) 
The dependent variable in column 1, 2 and 3 are total CSP, Strength and Concerns. 
Strength is measured by the sum of the number of “Strength” within five areas of 
CSP-(product, employees, human rights, community and environment). Concern is 
the sum of the number of “Concern” within five areas of CSP, and Total CSP is the 
difference between the Strength and Concern. Proportion of Female Directors is the 
total number of females on board divided by board size. Board Independence is the 
ratio of the outsiders divided by board size. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one in a given year if the CEO and chair positions are combined and zero 
otherwise. Board Average Age is the average age of all the directors on the firm. 
Board Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the board. ROA is net profit 
div ided by total asset. Firm Size is total asset of the firm. Leverage is long-term 
debt to total asset. R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided by net sales. 
All specifications include year and state dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for 
potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are clustered by firm.  
Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level.  
 
Total CSP Strength Concern Total CSP Strength Concern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 10.22*** 9.256*** -0.556 9.262*** 8.015*** -0.893
(3.505) (4.087) (-0.229) (3.153) (3.512) (-0.367)
Litigation Risk 0.135* 0.124* -0.0169 -0.281 -0.415*** -0.165
(1.646) (1.943) (-0.242) (-1.640) (-3.030) (-1.327)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors * Litigation Risk 4.311*** 5.574*** 1.539
(2.771) (4.444) (1.436)
Board Independence -0.751*** -0.150 0.421** -0.760*** -0.163 0.417**
(-2.933) (-0.745) (2.110) (-2.969) (-0.808) (2.091)
CEO Duality -0.0564 0.0147 0.0542* -0.0568 0.0142 0.0540*
(-1.361) (0.438) (1.906) (-1.369) (0.426) (1.897)
Board Average Age 0.0161 0.0249*** 0.00881 0.0164 0.0252*** 0.00889
(1.475) (2.912) (1.011) (1.496) (2.950) (1.020)
Board Ownership -0.129 0.0303 0.134** -0.131 0.0278 0.133**
(-1.464) (0.422) (2.279) (-1.487) (0.388) (2.266)
ROA 1.303*** 0.513** -0.775*** 1.296*** 0.504** -0.778***
(5.195) (2.533) (-4.499) (5.169) (2.489) (-4.511)
Firm Size -0.179*** 0.466*** 0.593*** -0.179*** 0.466*** 0.593***
(-4.717) (15.77) (19.11) (-4.713) (15.78) (19.11)
Leverage -0.286* -0.634*** -0.166 -0.277* -0.621*** -0.165
(-1.731) (-4.801) (-1.394) (-1.676) (-4.699) (-1.380)
R&D Intensity 3.052*** 2.260*** -0.650** 3.113*** 2.339*** -0.628**
(7.745) (7.312) (-2.084) (7.887) (7.559) (-2.011)
Constant -0.905 -4.791*** -3.453*** -0.839 -4.704*** -3.428***
(-0.578) (-3.757) (-3.303) (-0.536) (-3.693) (-3.279)
R-squared 0.147 0.322 0.407 0.147 0.322 0.407
Observations 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect No No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No No
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5.3.5 Robustness check-Female directors and CSP in a more 
innovative environment 
In this section I examine whether female directors have a 
stronger impact on negative CSP when firms’ strategy is more 
innovation intensive. Firms with higher R&D Intensity is argued to be 
more strongly associated with the introduction of the new and 
improved processes and products (Hitt et al., 1996; McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000) which improve the welfare of the community (Padgett 
and Galan, 2010). Thus, female directors’ efficient addressing of the 
negative CSP might be stronger when a firm’s strategy is more 
focused on innovation. An innovation intensive environment is 
expected to support female directors’ ability to be involved in the 
process and in product differentiation. This active participation will 
enable female directors to adopt innovative social initiatives which in 
turn will reduce the Concern dimension of CSP.  
As a proxy for innovation intensity, I use R&D Intensity 
measured as the ratio of R&D expense to net sales, following 
McWilliam and Siegel (2000). The results of 2SLS are reported in 
Table 5.8. In columns 1-3, I report Total CSP, Strength and Concern 
regressions that include R&D Intensity and an interaction variable of 
the product of instrumented female directors and R&D Intensity. In 
columns 4-6, I repeat the same process including firm fixed effects. 
In these regressions, the coefficient of the interaction variable 
(product of instrumented female directors and R&D Intensity) comes 
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with a significantly positive sign (p<0.01) in columns 1 and 2 for Total 
CSP and Strength dimension of CSP with a significantly negative sign 
(p<0.01) in column 3 for the Concern dimension of CSP. The results 
suggest that R&D intensity induces female directors to undertake 
more positive social practices and less negative social practices which 
ultimately improve total CSP. The signs remain the same and 
significant at the 1% level, after considering firm fixed effects. 
Therefore, I provide evidence that firms that are more oriented toward 
innovation and encourages female directors’ capacity to make 
innovative strategies, exhibit more positive CSP and less negative 
CSP. 
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Table 5.8 2SLS estimation (with Innovation Intensity) 
The dependent variable in column 1, 2 and 3 are Total CSP, Strength and 
Concerns. The specifications in columns 6-10 include firm fixed effects. 
Strength is measured by the sum of the number of “Strength” within five 
areas of CSP-(product, employees, human rights, community and 
environment). Concern is the sum of the number of “Concern” within five 
areas of CSP, and Total CSP is the difference between the Strength and 
Concern. Proportion of Female Directors is the total number of females on 
board divided by board size. R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense 
divided by net sales. Advertising intensity is advertising expense divided by 
net sales. Board Independence is the ratio of the outsiders divided by board 
size. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a given year if 
the CEO and chair positions are combined and zero otherwise. Board 
Average Age is the average age of all the directors on the firm. Board 
Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the board. ROA is net 
profit divided by total asset. Firm Size is total asset of the firm. Leverage is 
long-term debt to total asset. Standard errors are adjusted for potential 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are clustered by firm.  
Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level. 
 
Total CSP Strength Concern Total CSP Strength Concern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors -2.619** 1.347 4.057*** 28.68 29.99** 1.312
(-2.042) (1.545) (4.043) (1.571) (2.042) (0.109)
R&D Intensity -1.970** -0.783 1.324** -8.041*** -4.738*** 3.303***
(-2.266) (-1.037) (2.476) (-5.767) (-4.225) (3.602)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors * R&D Intensity 55.66*** 35.03*** -21.25*** 114.2*** 80.51*** -33.67***
(4.513) (3.302) (-2.874) (10.72) (9.397) (-4.807)
Board Independence -0.0308 0.282 0.161 -2.186* -2.112** 0.0733
(-0.141) (1.632) (0.993) (-1.811) (-2.177) (0.0923)
CEO Duality -0.0299 0.0300 0.0446 0.00959 0.0228 0.0132
(-0.569) (0.705) (1.323) (0.181) (0.536) (0.380)
Board Average Age -0.0178** 0.00459 0.0211*** 0.103* 0.110** 0.00692
(-2.080) (0.628) (3.258) (1.665) (2.209) (0.170)
Board Ownership -0.0984 0.0499 0.124*** -0.146 -0.0409 0.105
(-1.607) (0.960) (2.639) (-1.351) (-0.470) (1.480)
ROA 1.137*** 0.393* -0.724*** 1.251*** 0.630** -0.620***
(4.254) (1.779) (-3.901) (3.645) (2.284) (-2.748)
Firm Size -0.0699* 0.532*** 0.554*** -0.353*** 0.00109 0.354***
(-1.721) (17.42) (14.34) (-5.529) (0.0212) (8.433)
Leverage -0.177 -0.579*** -0.217 -0.327 -0.206 0.121
(-0.958) (-3.643) (-1.589) (-0.860) (-0.673) (0.484)
Constant 0.681 -3.814*** -4.027*** -4.688 -6.349** -1.661
(1.295) (-8.876) (-9.140) (-1.201) (-2.023) (-0.647)
Observations 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097 9,097
R-squared 0.145 0.325 0.404 0.221 0.225 0.242
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
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5.4 Regression Results: Female Directors and CSP-CFP Nexus 
In this section I examine how female directors’ social 
responsiveness contributes to financial performance. Endogeneity 
might also be an issue here due to reverse casualty between CSP and 
CFP, as financially successful companies might have more resources 
to spend on CSP. To address this potential endogeneity concern, I use 
2SLS regression analyses. The literature related to CSP provides an 
interesting choice of instruments. Deng et al. (2013) consider 
endogeneity using religion rank of the state suggesting that the 
degree of religiosity is positively correlated with CSR. Cheng et al. 
(2014) consider the use of CSR index for each country-sector and 
country–year pair, suggesting that firm’s CSR performance is 
influenced by the other firms within the same industry-country pair. 
Following these studies, I consider religiosity rank and industry 
average CSP as the instruments for CSP.  
The results of the first stage regressions are reported in Table 
5.9. The strengths of the instruments are evident. From the first-
stage regressions, industry average CSP, industry average strength 
and concern are strong predictors of the Total CSP, Strength and 
Concern and significant at the 1% level in columns 1-3. However, 
religiosity rank is not significantly related to any specifications of 
CSP. The F-statistics of 6.08 from the first stage regression is lower 
than the rule of thumb threshold of 10. Therefore, I caution that I 
cannot rule out weak instrument issues entirely. 
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I carry out Sargan’s over-identifying restriction tests to assess 
the joint validity of the instruments. The test fails to reject the joint 
exogeneity of the instruments; therefore, the instruments may be 
considered to be valid.  
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Table 5.9 First Stage Regressions 
This table reports the first stage of an instrumental variables regression with 
industry average and rank religiosity as instruments for CSP. The dependent 
variable in column 1, 2 and 3 are Total CSP, Strength and Concern. The 
specifications in columns 4-6 include firm fixed effects. Strength is measured by the 
sum of the number of “Strength” within five areas of CSP-(product, employees, 
human rights, community and environment). Concern is the sum of the number of 
“Concern” within five areas of CSP, and Total CSP is the difference between the 
Strength and Concern. Proportion of Female Directors is the total number of females 
on board divided by board size. Board Independence is the ratio of the outsiders 
divided by board size. CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a 
given year if the CEO and chair positions are combined and zero otherwise. Board 
Average Age is the average age of all the directors on the firm. Board Ownership is 
the percentages of shares owned by the board. ROA is net profit divided by total 
asset. Firm Size is total asset of the firm. Leverage is long-term debt to total asset. 
R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided by net sales. Advertising 
intensity is advertising expense divided by net sales. Standard errors are adjusted 
for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are clustered by 
firm.  Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level. 
Total CSP Strength Concern Total CSP Strength Concern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry Avg CSP 0.954*** 0.891*** 0.808*** 0.958*** 0.899*** 0.795***
(17.10) (15.57) (15.85) (32.11) (27.35) (32.20)
Rank Religiousity 0.00463 0.00406 -0.00104 -0.0211 -0.0181 0.000320
(1.209) (1.415) (-0.345) (-1.126) (-1.187) (0.0261)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 1.343*** 1.686*** 0.355 0.522* 0.787*** 0.287
(3.477) (5.121) (1.435) (1.704) (3.149) (1.435)
Board Independence -0.110 0.192 0.219 -0.0536 -0.0538 0.00840
(-0.537) (1.194) (1.514) (-0.302) (-0.372) (0.0724)
CEO Duality -0.0624 0.0129 0.0681** -0.0318 0.0351 0.0577**
(-1.253) (0.323) (2.214) (-0.732) (0.991) (2.030)
Board Average Age -0.00555 -0.00335 0.00294 -0.00297 -0.00106 0.00278
(-0.742) (-0.507) (0.540) (-0.372) (-0.162) (0.534)
Board Ownership -0.0790 0.0233 0.0920** -0.00546 0.0517 0.0651
(-1.339) (0.474) (2.050) (-0.0635) (0.737) (1.159)
Firm Size -0.0220 0.534*** 0.520*** -0.208*** 0.105*** 0.319***
(-0.589) (17.12) (15.66) (-4.212) (2.615) (9.901)
Leverage -0.127 -0.424*** -0.138 0.283 0.355** 0.0944
(-0.709) (-2.704) (-1.105) (1.490) (2.295) (0.760)
R&D Intensity 1.475*** 0.995*** -0.318 -0.178 0.604 0.810*
(4.342) (3.197) (-1.236) (-0.274) (1.137) (1.905)
Adv Intensity 3.470** 2.872** -0.874 0.869 -1.011 -1.624
(2.415) (2.430) (-0.913) (0.503) (-0.718) (-1.440)
Constant -0.986 -5.389*** -3.635*** 0.529 -1.512 -2.004**
(-0.808) (-10.40) (-2.739) (0.352) (-1.232) (-2.041)
Observations 9,113 9,113 9,113 9,113 9,113 9,113
R-squared 0.265 0.408 0.508 0.304 0.288 0.332
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.95 0.94 0.888 0.696 0.93 0.683
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
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I next run performance regressions after including two new 
variables: instrumented CSP and the product of the instrumented 
CSP and the instrumented proportion of female directors. I report 
2SLS estimates with firm and without firm fixed effects. In Table 
5.10, I first report ROA-CSP without any interaction term, where 
columns 1-3 show the association between ROA and Total CSP, 
Strength and Concern respectively. 
The regression results show that Total CSP (p<0.01) and 
Strength (p<0.10) are positively correlated with ROA in columns 1 and 
2 respectively. This suggests that firms that undertake positive social 
practices enjoy higher profitability. As expected, the Concern 
dimension of CSP is negatively related to ROA. The coefficient of the 
Proportion of Female Directors is insignificant in all specifications, 
therefore, providing no evidence that the proportion of female 
directors improve firm profitability. 
In Table 5.11, I include the interaction term: the product of the 
instrumented CSP and the instrumented female directors. The 
coefficient of the interaction variable is negative and significant in 
columns 1 and 2. This suggests that the association between CSP 
and CFP is less positive when a larger proportion of female directors 
are on board. However, the significant relation disappears when I 
include firm fixed effects suggesting the result may be driven by 
unobserved omitted variables. 
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The interaction between instrumented Proportion of Female 
Directors and instrumented Concern dimension in column 3 of Table 
5.11 enters with a negative sign but is not statistically significant.  
In sum, I cautiously conclude from the regression results 
reported in Table 5.10 and 5.11 that positive social initiatives 
improve firm value. However, when female directors are on the board 
the association is less positive. This provides evidence for our 
proposition (H3) that females improve CSP with less concern for its 
impact on financial performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
Table 5.10 2SLS estimation of the CSP-CFP nexus 
This table shows the association between CSP and ROA where CSP is 
measured in column 1, 2 and 3 as Total CSP, Strength and Concern. The 
specifications in columns 4-6 include firm fixed effects. Strength is measured 
by the sum of the number of “Strength” within five areas of CSP-(product, 
employees, human rights, community and environment). Concern is the sum of the 
number of “Concern” within five areas of CSP, and Total CSP is the difference 
between the Strength and Concern. The dependent variable is ROA which is the 
net profit divided by total asset. Proportion of Female Directors is the total 
number of females on board divided by board size. Board Independence is 
the ratio of the outsiders divided by board size. CEO Duality is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one in a given year if the CEO and chair positions 
are combined and zero otherwise. Board Average Age is the average age of 
all the directors on the firm. Board Ownership is the percentages of shares 
owned by the board. Firm Size is total asset of the firm. Leverage is long-
term debt to total asset. R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided 
by net sales. Advertising Intensity is advertising expense divided by net 
sales. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation and they are clustered by firm.  Asterisks indicate 
significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level. 
 
 
Dependent Variable : ROA
Total CSP Strength Concern Total CSP Strength Concern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 0.179 0.181 0.192 -0.109 -0.124 -0.0947
(0.945) (0.950) (1.012) (-0.149) (-0.169) (-0.129)
Instrumented CSP 0.00373*** 0.00342* -0.00291* 0.00385*** 0.00489*** -0.00202
(2.757) (1.871) (-1.668) (3.057) (2.715) (-1.171)
Board Independence 0.00677 0.00544 0.00635 0.0249 0.0257 0.0237
(0.469) (0.377) (0.440) (0.518) (0.535) (0.493)
CEO Duality 8.66e-05 -0.000102 0.000142 0.00181 0.00161 0.00194
(0.0445) (-0.0523) (0.0728) (0.900) (0.799) (0.962)
Board Average Age 0.000253 0.000241 0.000257 -0.00101 -0.00107 -0.000985
(0.364) (0.346) (0.369) (-0.408) (-0.433) (-0.399)
Board Ownership -0.00772** -0.00825** -0.00781** -0.00489 -0.00531 -0.00493
(-2.192) (-2.336) (-2.220) (-1.206) (-1.310) (-1.215)
Firm Size 0.00685*** 0.00493* 0.00820*** 0.0122*** 0.0110*** 0.0119***
(2.727) (1.837) (3.108) (5.325) (4.835) (5.118)
Leverage -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.145***
(-13.97) (-13.96) (-14.10) (-9.374) (-9.441) (-9.319)
R&D Intensity -0.584*** -0.582*** -0.579*** -0.796*** -0.800*** -0.795***
(-22.71) (-22.61) (-22.52) (-23.30) (-23.42) (-23.26)
Adv Intensity -0.203** -0.203** -0.194** -0.316*** -0.313*** -0.318***
(-2.511) (-2.499) (-2.399) (-3.523) (-3.487) (-3.547)
Constant 0.112 0.110 0.103 0.155 0.162 0.155
(1.435) (1.400) (1.319) (1.012) (1.060) (1.011)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.235 0.235 0.234 0.202 0.202 0.201
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5.11 2SLS estimation of CSP-CFP nexus (with interaction 
term) 
This table shows the impact of female directors on the CSP-ROA nexus where CSP 
is measured in column 1, 2 and 3 as Total CSP, Strength and Concern. The 
specifications in columns 4-6 include firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
ROA which is calculated as the net profit divided by total asset. Proportion of Female 
Directors is the total number of females on board divided by board size. Board 
Independence is the ratio of the outsiders divided by board size. CEO Duality is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one in a given year if the CEO and chair positions 
are combined and zero otherwise. Board Average Age is the average age of all the 
directors on the firm. Board Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the 
board. Firm Size is total asset of the firm. Leverage is long-term debt to total asset. 
R&D Intensity is measured by R&D expense divided by net sales. Advertising 
Intensity is advertising expense divided by net sales. Standard errors are adjusted 
for potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are clustered by fir 
mid.  Asterisks indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level. 
Dependent Variable : ROA
Total CSP Strength Concern Total CSP Strength Concern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 0.168 0.210 0.210 -0.119 -0.157 -0.173
(0.885) (1.108) (1.100) (-0.162) (-0.214) (-0.236)
Instrumented CSP 0.00734*** 0.0103*** -0.000846 0.00694** 0.000378-0.00803***
(2.654) (3.307) (-0.303) (2.510) (0.0961) (-2.793)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors * Intrumented CSP -0.0321* -0.0516*** -0.0188 -0.0308 0.0382 0.0605***
(-1.678) (-2.657) (-0.948) (-1.255) (1.289) (2.613)
Board Independence 0.00737 0.00447 0.00580 0.0254 0.0265 0.0264
(0.510) (0.311) (0.403) (0.530) (0.551) (0.550)
CEO Duality 8.05e-05 0.000114 0.000214 0.00178 0.00149 0.00165
(0.0414) (0.0583) (0.110) (0.883) (0.741) (0.820)
Board Average Age 0.000228 0.000207 0.000261 -0.00104 -0.00105 -0.00103
(0.328) (0.300) (0.378) (-0.419) (-0.426) (-0.418)
Board Ownership -0.00763** -0.00810** -0.00780** -0.00490 -0.00529 -0.00495
(-2.171) (-2.294) (-2.217) (-1.209) (-1.304) (-1.220)
Firm Size 0.00690*** 0.00386 0.00801*** 0.0122*** 0.0111*** 0.0121***
(2.743) (1.422) (3.046) (5.320) (4.896) (5.177)
Leverage -0.152*** -0.150*** -0.153*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.145***
(-13.89) (-13.74) (-14.12) (-9.362) (-9.431) (-9.300)
R&D Intensity -0.587*** -0.581*** -0.576*** -0.797*** -0.800*** -0.797***
(-22.76) (-22.74) (-22.42) (-23.32) (-23.40) (-23.31)
Adv Intensity -0.205** -0.206** -0.192** -0.316*** -0.315*** -0.320***
(-2.527) (-2.536) (-2.379) (-3.521) (-3.506) (-3.567)
Constant 0.114 0.122 0.104 0.156 0.162 0.160
(1.457) (1.556) (1.344) (1.023) (1.062) (1.045)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.235 0.238 0.236 0.202 0.202 0.202
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
79 
 
5.4.1 Robustness check-Alternative measure of firm performance 
In order to test the robustness, I run the regressions using 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable; the results are reported in Table 
5.12 and 5.13. Table 5.12 shows the association between CSP and 
Tobin’s Q is insignificant after inclusion of firm fixed-effects. Table 
5.13 reports the impact of female directors on CSP-Tobin’s Q relation. 
A significant (p<0.05) negative coefficient is found between the 
Proportion of Female Directors and Strength dimension of CSP-Tobin’s 
Q relation (column 2) and robust to firm fixed effects. This suggests 
that the findings depend on the proxies used for financial 
performance. 
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Table 5.12 2SLS estimation of CSP-CFP nexus 
This table shows the association between CSP and Tobin’s Q where CSP is 
measured in column 1, 2 and 3 as Total CSP, Strength and Concern. The 
specifications in columns 4-6 include firm fixed effects. Strength is measured by the 
sum of the number of “Strength” within five areas of CSP-(product, employees, 
human rights, community and environment). Concern is the sum of the number of 
“Concern” within five areas of CSP, and Total CSP is the difference between the 
Strength and Concern. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of 
the firm’s market value to its book value of asset. Market value of the firm is book 
assets minus book equity plus market value of equity. Proportion of Female 
Directors is the total number of females on board divided by board size. Board 
Independence is the ratio of the outsiders divided by board size. CEO Duality is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one in a given year if the CEO and chair positions 
are combined and zero otherwise. Board Average Age is the average age of all the 
directors on the firm. Board Ownership is the percentages of shares owned by the 
board. Leverage is long-term debt to total asset. R&D Intensity is measured by R&D 
expense divided by net sales. Advertising Intensity is advertising expense divided by 
net sales. Standard errors are adjusted for potential heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation and they are clustered by firm. Asterisks indicate significance at the 
0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level. 
 
Dependent Variable : Tobin's Q
Total CSP Strength Concern Total CSP Strength Concern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors -0.254 -0.718 -0.521 4.624 4.236 4.159
(-0.0306) (-0.0863) (-0.0628) (0.121) (0.111) (0.109)
Instrumented CSP -0.0767 0.0559 0.170* -0.0600 0.0477 0.131
(-0.886) (0.424) (1.871) (-0.913) (0.508) (1.459)
Board Independence 0.788 0.810 0.767 0.186 0.219 0.216
(1.132) (1.168) (1.104) (0.0743) (0.0874) (0.0861)
CEO Duality 0.0184 0.0188 0.0117 0.0699 0.0665 0.0645
(0.177) (0.181) (0.112) (0.666) (0.633) (0.614)
Board Average Age -0.0518* -0.0517* -0.0523* -0.0173 -0.0178 -0.0189
(-1.702) (-1.700) (-1.719) (-0.134) (-0.138) (-0.147)
Board Ownership -0.248 -0.240 -0.261* -0.140 -0.138 -0.149
(-1.590) (-1.544) (-1.667) (-0.663) (-0.653) (-0.706)
Firm Size 0.0515 0.0253 -0.0344 -0.873*** -0.863*** -0.899***
(0.487) (0.198) (-0.296) (-7.321) (-7.280) (-7.407)
Leverage 3.454*** 3.500*** 3.478*** 3.276*** 3.256*** 3.243***
(4.441) (4.483) (4.469) (4.028) (4.001) (3.987)
R&D Intensity 0.405 0.233 0.347 -3.938** -3.941** -4.041**
(0.305) (0.175) (0.263) (-2.212) (-2.212) (-2.267)
Adv Intensity 5.398 5.017 5.230 4.316 4.379 4.405
(0.981) (0.910) (0.949) (0.923) (0.936) (0.942)
Constant 19.53** 19.88** 19.64** 23.22*** 23.21*** 23.39***
(2.156) (2.198) (2.166) (2.912) (2.910) (2.933)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.101 0.102 0.102 0.044 0.044 0.044
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
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 Table 5.13 2SLS estimation of CSP-CFP nexus (with interaction 
term) 
This table shows the impact of female directors on the association between CSP and 
Tobin’s Q where CSP is measured in column 1, 2 and 3 as Total CSP, Strength and 
Concern. The specifications in columns 4-6 include firm fixed effects. Strength is 
measured by the sum of the number of “Strength” within five areas of CSP-
(product, employees, human rights, community and environment). Concern is the 
sum of the number of “Concern” within five areas of CSP, and Total CSP is the 
difference between the Strength and Concern. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value of asset. Market 
value of the firm is book assets minus book equity plus market value of equity. 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value of asset. Market 
value of the firm is book assets minus book equity plus market value of equity. 
Proportion of Female Directors is the total number of females on board divided by 
board size. Board Independence is the ratio of the outsiders divided by board size. 
CEO Duality is a dummy variable that is equal to one in a given year if the CEO and 
chair positions are combined and zero otherwise. Board Average Age is the average 
age of all the directors on the firm. Board Ownership is the percentages of shares 
owned by the board. Leverage is long-term debt to total asset. R&D Intensity is 
measured by R&D expense divided by net sales. Advertising intensity is advertising 
expense divided by net sales. Standard errors are adjusted for potential 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation and they are clustered by firm.  Asterisks 
indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level. 
Dependent Variable : Tobin's Q
Total CSP Strength Concern Total CSP Strength Concern
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 9.685*** 11.82*** 9.946*** 3.743 6.672 3.602
(3.761) (4.374) (3.498) (0.0980) (0.175) (0.0942)
Instrumented CSP 0.0545 0.340** 0.270* 0.228 0.381* 0.0887
(0.411) (2.158) (1.861) (1.581) (1.856) (0.592)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors * Intrumented CSP -1.310 -1.990** -0.497 -2.872** -2.822* 0.430
(-1.490) (-2.033) (-0.478) (-2.244) (-1.825) (0.356)
Board Independence 0.0902 -0.0440 0.0306 0.237 0.163 0.235
(0.232) (-0.114) (0.0785) (0.0948) (0.0652) (0.0938)
CEO Duality 0.0191 0.0260 0.0116 0.0668 0.0750 0.0624
(0.185) (0.250) (0.112) (0.637) (0.713) (0.594)
Board Average Age -0.0212 -0.0216 -0.0224 -0.0198 -0.0190 -0.0192
(-1.129) (-1.147) (-1.184) (-0.154) (-0.148) (-0.149)
Board Ownership -0.295* -0.285* -0.313** -0.141 -0.140 -0.149
(-1.924) (-1.865) (-2.034) (-0.669) (-0.661) (-0.707)
Firm Size -0.0695 -0.162* -0.185** -0.874*** -0.874*** -0.898***
(-0.971) (-1.649) (-2.213) (-7.332) (-7.365) (-7.397)
Leverage 3.158*** 3.242*** 3.191*** 3.294*** 3.244*** 3.246***
(4.328) (4.419) (4.374) (4.050) (3.986) (3.989)
R&D Intensity 1.720 1.516 1.758 -4.017** -3.975** -4.052**
(1.500) (1.315) (1.547) (-2.256) (-2.232) (-2.273)
Adv Intensity 7.865 7.293 7.760 4.337 4.505 4.393
(1.557) (1.443) (1.532) (0.928) (0.963) (0.939)
Constant 16.26* 17.31** 16.81* 23.37*** 23.18*** 23.43***
(1.865) (1.987) (1.934) (2.931) (2.907) (2.937)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.068 0.066 0.07 0.044 0.044 0.044
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
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5.4.2 Robustness check-Stakeholder’s heterogeneity                               
In this section, I examine how female directors’ positive 
attitudes and actions toward each stakeholder affect CFP. This will 
help to examine the effect of heterogeneity among stakeholders on 
CSP-CFP relation. The results, reported in Appendix C and D, suggest 
that positive initiatives toward community and environment improve 
ROA whilst initiatives to improve human rights reduce firm value. 
However, no significant relation is found when female directors are on 
board. 
 I also run the regressions using Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable. The results are reported in Appendix E and F and show that 
the association between CSP (representing community, employee, 
environment and products) and Tobin’s Q weakens when female 
directors are on board. This suggests that female directors’ positive 
social initiatives toward community, environment, employee and 
products significantly decrease firm value. Therefore, I find support in 
favour of my hypothesis using this alternative measure of firm 
performance. 
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  I replicate the previous analysis using each measure of Concern 
dimension of CSP and the results are reported in Appendix G and H. I 
find that negative social initiatives toward community and 
environment reduce firm value. However, when female directors are 
on the board the association is less negative. Hence, a higher 
proportion of female directors improves profitability by reducing 
negative practices towards the community, employees and the 
environment. However, no significant relation is found when Tobin’s 
Q is used as an alternative measure of performance and the results 
are reported in Appendix I and J. 
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 5.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I find statistical support for my hypotheses on 
the association between the proportion of female directors and CSP. 
The proportion of female directors is positively related to the Strength 
dimension of CSP and Total CSP. Moreover, litigation risk and 
innovation intensity induce female directors to undertake more 
positive social practices which improve total CSP. The results are 
robust to the possibility of reverse causality and omitted variables. 
However, I do not find evidence of any relation between the Proportion 
of Female Directors and the Concern dimension of CSP. Female 
directors are associated with significantly less negative social 
practices only to the extent that a firm’s strategy is focused on 
innovation. Analysis of how female directors’ social orientation affects 
financial health shows interesting results. I find that the positive 
relation between Strength dimension of CSP-CFP weakens when 
female directors’ are on board, suggesting that female directors care 
less how their positive social incentives affect firm value. However, 
Concern CSP less negatively affects firm value when female directors 
are on board, though the result is not robust to market based 
measures of firm performance. 
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 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings of the thesis, limitations 
and scope of further research. Section 6.2 summarizes the findings of 
the thesis. Section 6.3 explains the limitations of the study and 
outlines the further scopes for research. 
6.2 Summary of Results 
While extant research focuses on the impact of female directors 
on CSP, most researchers have focused only on examining a very 
specific dimension of CSP. Corporate social responsibility is multi-
dimensional with few studies testing the association between female 
directors and CSP in a multidimensional setting (Bear et al., 2010; 
Zhang, 2012; Boulouta, 2013). Moreover, most of the studies do not 
adequately address endogeneity issue such as unobserved variable or 
reverse causality bias.  
To address these concerns, I investigate the association 
between the proportion of female directors and CSP with a 
multidimensional measure of KLD data and a large panel dataset. I 
also examine how female directors’ social sensitivity affects financial 
performance. My study adopts a two-stage least squares approach to 
control for the potential endogeneity between board gender diversity 
and social performance, where I select the instrumental based on 
sound theoretical grounds and adequately test for both validity and 
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relevance. Further, I examine whether the supposed benefit of having 
female directors on social performance are stronger in firms with high 
litigation risk and innovation intensity. 
Based on an unbalanced sample of 9097 firm-year observations 
representing 1540 US firms over the period of 1996-2013, I find that 
there is a significant relation between the proportion of female 
directors and the Strength dimension of CSP and Total CSP. I find no 
evidence of a relation for the Concern dimension of CSP. The results 
show that the positive relation between female directors and Strength 
dimension of CSP is even stronger in innovation intensive firms and 
high litigation industry risk. Therefore, when female directors face 
high litigation risk, to build stable relation with investors and other 
constituents, they are more likely to develop policy and undertake 
more positive social initiatives. Innovative intensive environment also 
encourages female directors to adopt innovative social initiatives 
which result in exemplary/positive CSP. 
I find no evidence of a significant relation between female 
directors and concern dimension of CSP, which is in contrast to the 
result of Boulouta (2013), but consistent with Post et al. (2011) and 
Zhang (2012). Female directors thus appear to not affect negative 
CSP, even after consideration of litigation risk. It is possible that 
female directors may have less discretion in influencing negative 
social practices (supporting Post et al., 2011 and Zhang, 2012). 
Female directors might encounter resistance in decision making 
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process on this issue which limit their influence on the concern 
dimension. Female directors are associated with significantly less 
negative social practices only to the extent that a firm’s strategy is 
focused on innovation.  
The analysis of CSP-CFP nexus shows that in the presence of 
higher proportion of female directors, the strength dimension of CSP 
has a less positive affect on CFP, whilst the concern dimension of 
CSP has a less negative affect on firm value. Therefore, while 
undertaking positive initiatives, female directors care somewhat less 
about how such initiatives affect firm value. This result is robust to 
firm fixed effects and an alternative market measure of firm value 
(Tobin’s Q). The results also show that female directors improve 
profitability of the firm by reducing negative CSP though the result is 
insignificant when market measure of firm value is considered.  
This study sheds light on the association between female 
directors and CSP. It emphasizes the multidimensional approach to 
operationalizing CSP as the association between female directors and 
CSP varies according to the choice of the social performance index. It 
also explores the boundary condition under which female directors 
may influence the negative CSP. It shows that female representation 
on board leads to less negative social performance only to the extent 
that a firm is focused on innovation as a part of its strategy. 
Therefore, it is important for managers to consider CSR initiatives in 
the light of the firm’s corporate abilities. More innovative firms may 
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be better off by employing more female directors. Gender diversity 
has been known as representing a ‘needed innovation’ for top 
management research (Carpenter et al., 2004). By elaborating on the 
benefits associated with having female directors and the 
contingencies under which these benefits are likely to be amplified, 
this study contributes to our understanding of the importance of 
managerial demographics for firm outcomes. Apart from shedding 
light on the literature examining the association between female 
directors and CSP, the research also sheds light on how female 
directors’ social orientation affects financial return. This type of 
research is limited given the current situation, where profitability and 
social outcomes both are taken together when firms are evaluated in 
the markets. By doing so this study provides insights on the 
literature that focus on the link between CSP and financial 
performance. 
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
This study has number of limitations. One often raised 
limitation is the considerations of the KLD data. Although it is the 
most widely used rating in the business and society field (Chatterji, 
2010) it is subject to criticism on their ability to predict social 
performance. Therefore further research is strongly encouraged 
considering alternative measures of positive and negative focused 
CSP.  
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It is possible that the link between female directors and CSP 
may depending on gender equality or stereotype beliefs in a particular 
country (i.e. cultural influences). Therefore, a sample across multiple 
countries could improve our understanding of the link between 
female directors and CSP and in turn CSP-CFP nexus. We will leave 
this suggestion for future research.  
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   Appendix A Definition of Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Definition
ROA Net profit before extraordinary items divided by total asset
Tobin's Q
R&D Intensity R&D expense divided by net sales
Adv Intensity Advertising Expense divided by net sales
Firm Size Natural log of total asset of the firm
Leverage Long-term debt to total asset
Board Size Total number of direcors on the board
Proportion of Female Directors Total number of females on board divided by board size
Board Independence The outsiders divided by board size
CEO Duality Dummy variable that is equal to one in a given year if the CEO and chair positions are combined and zero otherwise
Board Average Age The average age of all the directors on the firm
Board Ownership The percentages of shares owned by the board
Total CSP The difference between strength and concern
Strength Sum of the “strength” within five areas of CSP (product, employees, human rights, community and environment)
Concern Sum of the “concern” within five areas of CSP
The ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value of asset. Market value of the firm is calculated as the book 
assets minus book equity plus market value of equity
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            Appendix B KLD Rating 
  
 Concern Area Strength Area 
Community 
 
Firms actions resulted in negative impact on 
the community such as water 
contamination, product safety issues, 
involvement in serious controversies with 
indigenous peoples, has recently involved in 
major tax disputes, lending or investment 
practices that have led to controversies. 
Generous corporate giving, 
innovative giving, participating in 
public/private partnerships aimed at 
providing housing for the 
disadvantaged, support for local 
primary and secondary education,   
strong relations with indigenous 
peoples, exceptional volunteer 
program, strong in-kind giving 
program. 
Employee 
 
Poor union relations, payment of substantial 
fines regarding worker safety conditions, 
dramatic workforce reductions, and 
inadequate retirement benefits programs.  
Strong union relations, consistent 
no-layoff policy, cash profit sharing, 
employee involvement in decision-
making processes, strong retirement 
benefits and health and safety 
programs. 
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Environment 
 
Payment of substantial fines or civil 
penalties for waste management violations, 
a consistent pattern of violations of air, 
water, and other environmental 
regulations, the use of ozone depleting 
chemicals,  the release of high levels of 
toxic chemicals, a substantial producer of 
agricultural chemicals. 
 
 
Production of environmentally 
safe product, aggressive pollution 
prevention and recycling 
programs, use of renewable 
energy and clean fuels, maintains 
plant and equipment with above 
average environmental 
performance, strong management 
systems through ISO 14001 
certification. 
 
Human Rights Operations in South Africa, Northern 
Ireland, Burma and Mexico have faced 
controversies. Also have had major 
controversies related to labor standards or 
with indigenous peoples.  
Established relations with 
indigenous peoples, noteworthy 
social record in South Africa, 
outstanding transparency on 
overseas sourcing disclosure or 
monitoring. Also whether 
companies have undertaken 
exceptional human rights 
initiatives. 
Products 
 
Payment of substantial fines or civil 
penalties relating to product safety or 
antitrust violations, involvement in 
controversial advertising programs. 
 
Commitment to quality through a 
well-developed quality program, 
leadership in industry research and 
development and involvement in 
providing products and services to 
the economically disadvantaged. 
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    Appendix C: 2SLS estimation of the Strength dimension of CSP-CFP nexus 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable : ROA
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 0.176 0.188 0.188 0.203 0.193 -0.176 -0.0977 -0.0868 -0.0282 -0.107
(0.927) (0.991) (0.988) (1.068) (1.014) (-0.240) (-0.133) (-0.118) (-0.0385) (-0.146)
Instrumented CSP 0.0109** 0.00373 0.00734* -0.0303** -0.00376 0.0152*** 0.00501 0.00748** -0.0296** -0.00555
(2.081) (1.163) (1.953) (-2.432) (-0.518) (3.063) (1.494) (2.087) (-2.275) (-0.803)
Board Independence 0.00619 0.00547 0.00466 0.00465 0.00554 0.0282 0.0233 0.0219 0.0191 0.0244
(0.428) (0.378) (0.322) (0.322) (0.383) (0.587) (0.485) (0.456) (0.397) (0.508)
CEO Duality 6.29e-05 4.29e-05 -0.000370 -0.000103 -2.44e-05 0.00203 0.00192 0.00145 0.00168 0.00185
(0.0323) (0.0220) (-0.188) (-0.0530) (-0.0125) (1.009) (0.951) (0.716) (0.833) (0.919)
Board Average Age 0.000193 0.000243 0.000289 0.000280 0.000249 -0.00127 -0.000991 -0.000904 -0.000770 -0.00103
(0.277) (0.350) (0.416) (0.403) (0.358) (-0.513) (-0.401) (-0.366) (-0.311) (-0.418)
Board Ownership -0.00827** -0.00820** -0.00833** -0.00812** -0.00824** -0.00506 -0.00517 -0.00534 -0.00529 -0.00518
(-2.343) (-2.323) (-2.355) (-2.301) (-2.333) (-1.250) (-1.275) (-1.317) (-1.304) (-1.278)
Firm Size 0.00541** 0.00603** 0.00530** 0.00704*** 0.00684*** 0.00943*** 0.0105*** 0.0100*** 0.0118*** 0.0115***
(2.096) (2.333) (2.049) (2.792) (2.688) (4.013) (4.498) (4.258) (5.168) (5.044)
Leverage -0.151*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.142*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.149*** -0.146***
(-13.92) (-13.98) (-14.05) (-14.20) (-14.10) (-9.097) (-9.272) (-9.317) (-9.496) (-9.337)
R&D Intensity -0.581*** -0.581*** -0.578*** -0.577*** -0.578*** -0.803*** -0.800*** -0.797*** -0.794*** -0.798***
(-22.53) (-22.53) (-22.46) (-22.43) (-22.46) (-23.49) (-23.39) (-23.32) (-23.24) (-23.35)
Adv Intensity -0.214*** -0.196** -0.201** -0.183** -0.195** -0.352*** -0.320*** -0.322*** -0.303*** -0.321***
(-2.586) (-2.421) (-2.471) (-2.261) (-2.400) (-3.891) (-3.571) (-3.592) (-3.364) (-3.574)
Constant 0.112 0.103 0.108 0.0996 0.100 0.186 0.162 0.162 0.141 0.158
(1.422) (1.315) (1.380) (1.270) (1.278) (1.214) (1.056) (1.057) (0.921) (1.034)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.235 0.235 0.234 0.235 0.234 0.202 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix D: 2SLS estimation of the Strength dimension of CSP-CFP nexus (with interaction term) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable : ROA
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 0.207 0.205 0.203 0.203 0.198 -0.192 -0.134 -0.0812 -0.0137 -0.124
(1.090) (1.074) (1.072) (1.068) (1.041) (-0.262) (-0.183) (-0.111) (-0.0187) (-0.170)
Instrumented CSP 0.0291*** 0.00936 0.0263*** -0.0175 0.00354 0.00961 -0.00979 -0.00730 -0.00571 -0.0314**
(3.343) (1.510) (3.593) (-0.428) (0.201) (1.100) (-1.382) (-0.977) (-0.125) (-1.997)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors * Intrumented CSP -0.207*** -0.0501 -0.136*** -0.114 -0.0696 0.0632 0.132** 0.117** -0.194 0.263*
(-2.840) (-1.080) (-3.164) (-0.345) (-0.531) (0.781) (2.372) (2.253) (-0.544) (1.830)
Board Independence 0.00602 0.00523 0.00230 0.00468 0.00562 0.0287 0.0235 0.0224 0.0182 0.0237
(0.417) (0.363) (0.160) (0.324) (0.389) (0.598) (0.489) (0.467) (0.378) (0.494)
CEO Duality 0.000176 0.000138 -0.000313 -9.03e-05 -6.56e-06 0.00199 0.00161 0.00130 0.00168 0.00178
(0.0901) (0.0705) (-0.159) (-0.0462) (-0.00335) (0.988) (0.800) (0.640) (0.836) (0.883)
Board Average Age 0.000176 0.000233 0.000300 0.000276 0.000242 -0.00128 -0.000909 -0.000823 -0.000731 -0.000971
(0.254) (0.335) (0.435) (0.397) (0.348) (-0.517) (-0.368) (-0.333) (-0.295) (-0.393)
Board Ownership -0.00810** -0.00814** -0.00831** -0.00811** -0.00821** -0.00507 -0.00529 -0.00539 -0.00531 -0.00526
(-2.298) (-2.303) (-2.353) (-2.298) (-2.325) (-1.251) (-1.305) (-1.329) (-1.311) (-1.297)
Firm Size 0.00555** 0.00586** 0.00409 0.00702*** 0.00680*** 0.00940*** 0.0108*** 0.0107*** 0.0117*** 0.0117***
(2.151) (2.262) (1.561) (2.782) (2.670) (3.999) (4.630) (4.506) (5.133) (5.091)
Leverage -0.150*** -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.142*** -0.145*** -0.146*** -0.149*** -0.146***
(-13.78) (-13.95) (-13.88) (-14.09) (-14.08) (-9.098) (-9.308) (-9.380) (-9.493) (-9.370)
R&D Intensity -0.580*** -0.580*** -0.573*** -0.577*** -0.578*** -0.804*** -0.799*** -0.798*** -0.794*** -0.799***
(-22.55) (-22.58) (-22.49) (-22.44) (-22.43) (-23.50) (-23.37) (-23.35) (-23.20) (-23.37)
Adv Intensity -0.208** -0.195** -0.203** -0.184** -0.194** -0.351*** -0.318*** -0.316*** -0.304*** -0.326***
(-2.506) (-2.419) (-2.506) (-2.261) (-2.398) (-3.887) (-3.539) (-3.521) (-3.375) (-3.628)
Constant 0.115 0.106 0.120 0.100 0.101 0.188 0.158 0.152 0.139 0.157
(1.467) (1.360) (1.526) (1.280) (1.281) (1.228) (1.033) (0.994) (0.905) (1.028)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.237 0.236 0.239 0.235 0.235 0.202 0.202 0.202 0.201 0.201
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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  Appendix E: 2SLS estimation of the Strength dimension of CSP-CFP nexus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable : Tobin's Q
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors -0.717 -0.433 -0.559 -0.487 -0.648 4.097 4.412 4.478 4.074 5.684
(-0.0861) (-0.0522) (-0.0674) (-0.0587) (-0.0780) (0.107) (0.116) (0.117) (0.107) (0.149)
Instrumented CSP 0.139 -0.0837 0.0517 -0.145 0.827 0.0747 -0.171 0.00388 0.165 0.886**
-0.371 (-0.449) (0.194) (-0.245) (1.592) (0.288) (-0.980) (0.0208) (0.243) (2.459)
Board Independence 0.819 0.815 0.806 0.809 0.823 0.222 0.221 0.200 0.228 0.124
(1.177) (1.174) (1.160) (1.167) (1.187) (0.0888) (0.0884) (0.0800) (0.0910) (0.0496)
CEO Duality 0.0212 0.0194 0.0178 0.0200 0.0256 0.0698 0.0674 0.0688 0.0701 0.0716
(0.205) (0.187) (0.170) (0.192) (0.248) (0.665) (0.642) (0.652) (0.667) (0.682)
Board Average Age -0.0523* -0.0516* -0.0514* -0.0515* -0.0525* -0.0185 -0.0179 -0.0172 -0.0186 -0.0139
(-1.711) (-1.695) (-1.693) (-1.693) (-1.723) (-0.143) (-0.139) (-0.133) (-0.144) (-0.108)
Board Ownership -0.240 -0.238 -0.240 -0.239 -0.226 -0.136 -0.135 -0.136 -0.135 -0.127
(-1.544) (-1.532) (-1.541) (-1.534) (-1.454) (-0.644) (-0.638) (-0.645) (-0.641) (-0.603)
Firm Size 0.0378 0.0688 0.0446 0.0558 0.0188 -0.869*** -0.832*** -0.860*** -0.862*** -0.897***
(0.336) (0.619) (0.371) (0.520) (0.172) (-7.087) (-6.836) (-7.013) (-7.256) (-7.523)
Leverage 3.499*** 3.455*** 3.482*** 3.468*** 3.478*** 3.289*** 3.235*** 3.271*** 3.286*** 3.246***
(4.481) (4.443) (4.467) (4.429) (4.466) (4.031) (3.973) (4.021) (4.028) (3.991)
R&D Intensity 0.253 0.341 0.291 0.290 0.275 -3.943** -3.821** -3.914** -3.931** -3.814**
(0.191) (0.256) (0.220) (0.219) (0.208) (-2.211) (-2.143) (-2.198) (-2.206) (-2.142)
Adv Intensity 4.922 5.228 5.127 5.226 5.424 4.166 4.445 4.333 4.254 4.956
(0.888) (0.950) (0.931) (0.945) (0.989) (0.884) (0.950) (0.926) (0.907) (1.058)
Constant 19.87** 19.72** 19.80** 19.74** 20.03** 23.31*** 23.05*** 23.17*** 23.27*** 23.15***
(2.198) (2.183) (2.189) (2.185) (2.219) (2.918) (2.890) (2.906) (2.914) (2.904)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.102 0.102 0.101 0.102 0.102 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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 Appendix F: 2SLS estimation of the Strength dimension of CSP-CFP nexus (with interaction term) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
    
Dependent Variable : Tobin's Q
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 1.506 0.777 -0.0691 -0.452 0.0348 9.707 7.391 4.190 5.036 6.660
(0.179) (0.0930) (-0.00832) (-0.0545) (0.00418) (0.254) (0.194) (0.110) (0.132) (0.174)
Instrumented CSP 1.381*** 0.301 0.597* 1.468 1.650** 1.991*** 1.043*** 0.777** 1.747 2.336***
(2.959) (0.941) (1.815) (0.829) (2.017) (4.377) (2.828) (1.995) (0.732) (2.852)
Instrumented Proportion of  Female Directors * Intrumented CSP -14.10*** -3.428 -3.909* -14.45 -7.871 -21.58*** -10.87*** -6.131** -12.88 -14.76**
(-3.347) (-1.439) (-1.922) (-0.910) (-1.208) (-5.123) (-3.737) (-2.262) (-0.691) (-1.971)
Independence 0.797 0.791 0.733 0.810 0.829 0.0421 0.207 0.173 0.168 0.162
(1.143) (1.143) (1.057) (1.169) (1.195) (0.0168) (0.0825) (0.0692) (0.0669) (0.0648)
CEO Duality 0.0289 0.0263 0.0199 0.0218 0.0282 0.0840 0.0922 0.0768 0.0705 0.0757
(0.278) (0.252) (0.189) (0.210) (0.273) (0.801) (0.877) (0.727) (0.671) (0.721)
Board Average Age -0.0528* -0.0521* -0.0509* -0.0519* -0.0532* -0.0148 -0.0246 -0.0214 -0.0160 -0.0173
(-1.728) (-1.714) (-1.680) (-1.705) (-1.748) (-0.115) (-0.191) (-0.166) (-0.124) (-0.135)
Board Ownership -0.227 -0.234 -0.238 -0.237 -0.221 -0.134 -0.125 -0.134 -0.137 -0.123
(-1.459) (-1.504) (-1.530) (-1.520) (-1.427) (-0.636) (-0.592) (-0.634) (-0.649) (-0.583)
Firm Size 0.0482 0.0586 0.0108 0.0525 0.0151 -0.858*** -0.858*** -0.895*** -0.866*** -0.904***
(0.430) (0.527) (0.0909) (0.491) (0.139) (-7.009) (-7.047) (-7.241) (-7.281) (-7.573)
Leverage 3.560*** 3.474*** 3.527*** 3.494*** 3.486*** 3.296*** 3.280*** 3.325*** 3.289*** 3.275***
(4.565) (4.469) (4.515) (4.446) (4.480) (4.045) (4.030) (4.086) (4.031) (4.027)
R&D Intensity 0.335 0.308 0.382 0.303 0.308 -3.762** -3.878** -3.860** -3.889** -3.774**
(0.253) (0.232) (0.289) (0.229) (0.233) (-2.112) (-2.176) (-2.168) (-2.181) (-2.120)
Adv Intensity 5.344 5.224 5.029 5.184 5.427 4.031 4.207 4.002 4.184 5.236
(0.965) (0.951) (0.914) (0.939) (0.989) (0.856) (0.900) (0.855) (0.892) (1.118)
Constant 20.06** 19.94** 20.13** 19.84** 20.06** 22.60*** 23.35*** 23.67*** 23.10*** 23.21***
(2.233) (2.217) (2.226) (2.198) (2.222) (2.832) (2.930) (2.967) (2.892) (2.912)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.101 0.101 0.046 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.045
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix G: 2SLS estimation of the Concern dimension of CSP-CFP nexus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable : ROA
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 0.194 0.193 0.192 0.196 0.192 -0.0950 -0.105 -0.100 -0.0464 -0.0990
(1.021) (1.020) (1.012) (1.031) (1.013) (-0.130) (-0.144) (-0.137) (-0.0633) (-0.135)
Instrumented CSP 0.00674 -0.0189*** -0.000327 0.0188** -0.00140 0.00657 -0.0161*** 0.000242 0.0201*** -0.000254
(1.194) (-4.887) (-0.0961) (2.364) (-0.298) (0.939) (-4.776) (0.0639) (3.039) (-0.0554)
Board Independence 0.00528 0.00790 0.00560 0.00594 0.00571 0.0235 0.0263 0.0239 0.0211 0.0239
(0.365) (0.549) (0.387) (0.411) (0.395) (0.489) (0.549) (0.499) (0.439) (0.498)
CEO Duality -8.12e-05 0.000996 4.02e-06 0.000331 -2.66e-05 0.00178 0.00272 0.00186 0.00217 0.00186
(-0.0416) (0.509) (0.00205) (0.169) (-0.0136) (0.885) (1.347) (0.926) (1.077) (0.924)
Board Average Age 0.000239 0.000173 0.000247 0.000215 0.000247 -0.00101 -0.00109 -0.00102 -0.000877 -0.00101
(0.345) (0.250) (0.355) (0.309) (0.356) (-0.408) (-0.442) (-0.411) (-0.355) (-0.408)
Board Ownership -0.00834** -0.00742** -0.00816** -0.00811** -0.00815** -0.00530 -0.00441 -0.00514 -0.00521 -0.00512
(-2.365) (-2.109) (-2.317) (-2.293) (-2.307) (-1.306) (-1.089) (-1.267) (-1.287) (-1.263)
Firm Size 0.00633** 0.00894*** 0.00673*** 0.00568** 0.00690*** 0.0110*** 0.0131*** 0.0113*** 0.0102*** 0.0113***
(2.514) (3.505) (2.606) (2.259) (2.695) (4.806) (5.687) (4.784) (4.460) (4.793)
Leverage -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.146*** -0.144*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146***
(-14.09) (-13.99) (-14.10) (-14.01) (-14.10) (-9.355) (-9.236) (-9.337) (-9.330) (-9.348)
R&D Intensity -0.578*** -0.579*** -0.578*** -0.578*** -0.578*** -0.797*** -0.799*** -0.797*** -0.796*** -0.797***
(-22.44) (-22.59) (-22.46) (-22.45) (-22.46) (-23.32) (-23.41) (-23.34) (-23.30) (-23.34)
Adv Intensity -0.193** -0.206** -0.194** -0.196** -0.192** -0.317*** -0.331*** -0.317*** -0.318*** -0.317***
(-2.387) (-2.543) (-2.392) (-2.424) (-2.363) (-3.530) (-3.688) (-3.535) (-3.544) (-3.522)
Constant 0.102 0.0976 0.102 0.105 0.102 0.160 0.154 0.159 0.156 0.158
(1.299) (1.258) (1.297) (1.338) (1.304) (1.045) (1.006) (1.035) (1.019) (1.032)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.236 0.235 0.235 0.234 0.235 0.201 0.203 0.201 0.202 0.201
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix H: 2SLS estimation of the Concern dimension of CSP-CFP nexus (with interaction term) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable : ROA
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors 0.190 0.170 0.212 0.207 0.218 -0.124 -0.250 -0.144 -0.0456 -0.136
(1.000) (0.892) (1.115) (1.089) (1.147) (-0.169) (-0.341) (-0.197) (-0.0622) (-0.186)
Instrumented CSP 0.00162 -0.0270*** 0.00638 0.0390** 0.00881 -0.0492*** -0.0485*** -0.0124** 0.0221 -0.0107
(0.129) (-3.325) (1.068) (2.565) (1.039) (-2.960) (-5.999) (-2.055) (1.369) (-1.331)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors * Intrumented CSP 0.0551 0.0650 -0.0759 -0.212 -0.0975 0.573*** 0.299*** 0.137*** -0.0223 0.111
(0.495) (1.211) (-1.462) (-1.580) (-1.502) (3.698) (4.410) (2.694) (-0.139) (1.581)
Board Independence 0.00550 0.00872 0.00481 0.00617 0.00492 0.0248 0.0322 0.0258 0.0211 0.0253
(0.381) (0.607) (0.334) (0.427) (0.342) (0.517) (0.671) (0.536) (0.440) (0.527)
CEO Duality -0.000143 0.00103 0.000185 0.000418 0.000120 0.00145 0.00257 0.00150 0.00218 0.00172
(-0.0732) (0.526) (0.0947) (0.214) (0.0614) (0.720) (1.273) (0.745) (1.080) (0.853)
Board Average Age 0.000243 0.000164 0.000255 0.000203 0.000260 -0.000962 -0.00125 -0.00101 -0.000880 -0.00105
(0.350) (0.236) (0.369) (0.293) (0.376) (-0.390) (-0.506) (-0.409) (-0.356) (-0.423)
Board Ownership -0.00839** -0.00743** -0.00809** -0.00802** -0.00813** -0.00553 -0.00424 -0.00529 -0.00521 -0.00510
(-2.378) (-2.112) (-2.294) (-2.266) (-2.302) (-1.363) (-1.047) (-1.305) (-1.285) (-1.259)
Firm Size 0.00631** 0.00926*** 0.00682*** 0.00574** 0.00668*** 0.0108*** 0.0139*** 0.0111*** 0.0103*** 0.0114***
(2.514) (3.602) (2.647) (2.286) (2.616) (4.734) (6.041) (4.707) (4.459) (4.811)
Leverage -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.146*** -0.143*** -0.145*** -0.146*** -0.146***
(-14.12) (-14.00) (-14.16) (-14.04) (-14.07) (-9.330) (-9.205) (-9.309) (-9.331) (-9.364)
R&D Intensity -0.577*** -0.580*** -0.574*** -0.576*** -0.576*** -0.801*** -0.807*** -0.800*** -0.795*** -0.799***
(-22.39) (-22.55) (-22.41) (-22.43) (-22.42) (-23.44) (-23.64) (-23.42) (-23.29) (-23.37)
Adv Intensity -0.192** -0.207** -0.193** -0.195** -0.190** -0.313*** -0.344*** -0.315*** -0.318*** -0.318***
(-2.376) (-2.563) (-2.393) (-2.406) (-2.339) (-3.494) (-3.838) (-3.512) (-3.545) (-3.531)
Constant 0.100 0.0969 0.106 0.105 0.105 0.158 0.165 0.162 0.156 0.161
(1.280) (1.250) (1.353) (1.346) (1.355) (1.037) (1.079) (1.058) (1.019) (1.055)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.202 0.205 0.202 0.202 0.201 0.202 0.205 0.202 0.202 0.201
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix I: 2SLS estimation of the Concern dimension of CSP-CFP nexus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable : Tobin's Q
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors -0.490 -0.554 -0.533 -0.559 -0.566 4.435 4.530 2.919 3.856 3.950
(-0.0590) (-0.0667) (-0.0643) (-0.0674) (-0.0683) (0.116) (0.119) (0.0764) (0.101) (0.103)
Instrumented CSP 0.151 0.263 0.321* -0.247 0.458 -0.0539 0.168 0.378* -0.233 0.297
(0.408) (1.214) (1.711) (-0.646) (1.555) (-0.148) (0.956) (1.916) (-0.676) (1.241)
Board Independence 0.806 0.782 0.787 0.807 0.767 0.205 0.176 0.273 0.234 0.204
(1.161) (1.126) (1.134) (1.161) (1.102) (0.0818) (0.0703) (0.109) (0.0934) (0.0816)
CEO Duality 0.0186 0.00625 0.0143 0.0161 0.0283 0.0697 0.0601 0.0646 0.0655 0.0748
(0.180) (0.0595) (0.138) (0.156) (0.272) (0.663) (0.570) (0.615) (0.623) (0.712)
Board Average Age -0.0518* -0.0507* -0.0527* -0.0512* -0.0522* -0.0172 -0.0164 -0.0241 -0.0188 -0.0193
(-1.703) (-1.668) (-1.736) (-1.681) (-1.716) (-0.134) (-0.127) (-0.187) (-0.146) (-0.150)
Board Ownership -0.242 -0.250 -0.257 -0.240 -0.250 -0.135 -0.144 -0.153 -0.135 -0.142
(-1.555) (-1.593) (-1.644) (-1.541) (-1.607) (-0.638) (-0.680) (-0.726) (-0.640) (-0.673)
Firm Size 0.0463 0.0231 0.000660 0.0670 -0.0176 -0.857*** -0.878*** -0.922*** -0.847*** -0.903***
(0.435) (0.211) (0.00593) (0.629) (-0.152) (-7.174) (-7.323) (-7.512) (-7.074) (-7.317)
Leverage 3.475*** 3.457*** 3.504*** 3.457*** 3.479*** 3.272*** 3.251*** 3.336*** 3.267*** 3.280***
(4.463) (4.448) (4.499) (4.441) (4.472) (4.022) (3.996) (4.098) (4.016) (4.033)
R&D Intensity 0.298 0.311 0.392 0.282 0.280 -3.919** -3.898** -3.868** -3.934** -3.944**
(0.226) (0.236) (0.296) (0.213) (0.212) (-2.201) (-2.189) (-2.172) (-2.209) (-2.215)
Adv Intensity 5.190 5.358 5.450 5.216 4.663 4.332 4.476 4.444 4.343 3.918
(0.941) (0.976) (0.988) (0.947) (0.843) (0.926) (0.957) (0.950) (0.929) (0.836)
Constant 19.75** 19.80** 19.67** 19.70** 19.49** 23.16*** 23.22*** 23.97*** 23.20*** 23.41***
(2.187) (2.189) (2.170) (2.180) (2.144) (2.904) (2.911) (3.002) (2.909) (2.935)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.101 0.102 0.102 0.101 0.102 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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  Appendix J: 2SLS estimation of the Concern dimension of CSP-CFP nexus (with interaction term) 
   
 
 
Dependent Variable : Tobin's Q
Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products Community Employee Environment Human Rights Products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors -0.537 -0.509 -0.992 -0.0120 0.909 4.315 2.266 3.522 4.800 6.976
(-0.0646) (-0.0607) (-0.118) (-0.00144) (0.109) (0.113) (0.0593) (0.0922) (0.126) (0.183)
Instrumented CSP 0.0718 0.277 0.172 0.657 1.029** -0.286 -0.339 0.552* 2.111** 1.144***
(0.113) (0.797) (0.482) (0.988) (2.103) (-0.330) (-0.804) (1.761) (2.507) (2.726)
Instrumented Proportion of Female Directors * Intrumented CSP 0.853 -0.112 1.686 -9.529 -5.463 2.383 4.689 -1.899 -25.44*** -8.952**
(0.140) (-0.0429) (0.585) (-1.621) (-1.531) (0.295) (1.322) (-0.715) (-3.049) (-2.457)
Board Independence 0.808 0.780 0.807 0.810 0.719 0.210 0.267 0.248 0.299 0.0896
(1.165) (1.123) (1.161) (1.167) (1.034) (0.0840) (0.107) (0.0991) (0.120) (0.0358)
CEO Duality 0.0181 0.00605 0.00973 0.0206 0.0371 0.0683 0.0577 0.0696 0.0717 0.0863
(0.174) (0.0575) (0.0938) (0.198) (0.355) (0.649) (0.548) (0.661) (0.683) (0.820)
Board Average Age -0.0518* -0.0507* -0.0530* -0.0516* -0.0513* -0.0171 -0.0188 -0.0241 -0.0225 -0.0163
(-1.703) (-1.666) (-1.741) (-1.696) (-1.689) (-0.132) (-0.146) (-0.187) (-0.175) (-0.127)
Board Ownership -0.243 -0.250 -0.259* -0.235 -0.248 -0.136 -0.141 -0.151 -0.128 -0.144
(-1.557) (-1.594) (-1.657) (-1.510) (-1.592) (-0.642) (-0.667) (-0.716) (-0.606) (-0.680)
Firm Size 0.0463 0.0235 -0.00135 0.0690 -0.0293 -0.858*** -0.865*** -0.920*** -0.822*** -0.906***
(0.435) (0.215) (-0.0121) (0.648) (-0.252) (-7.178) (-7.187) (-7.489) (-6.849) (-7.346)
Leverage 3.476*** 3.458*** 3.511*** 3.449*** 3.494*** 3.274*** 3.261*** 3.330*** 3.248*** 3.300***
(4.464) (4.449) (4.507) (4.432) (4.494) (4.024) (4.008) (4.090) (3.994) (4.058)
R&D Intensity 0.291 0.323 0.342 0.339 0.362 -3.936** -4.028** -3.824** -3.801** -3.829**
(0.221) (0.245) (0.258) (0.256) (0.273) (-2.209) (-2.259) (-2.146) (-2.135) (-2.150)
Adv Intensity 5.191 5.366 5.460 5.270 4.753 4.346 4.268 4.415 4.202 3.980
(0.942) (0.980) (0.991) (0.956) (0.859) (0.929) (0.912) (0.944) (0.899) (0.849)
Constant 19.73** 19.79** 19.56** 19.72** 19.66** 23.15*** 23.39*** 23.92*** 23.14*** 23.12***
(2.183) (2.188) (2.151) (2.189) (2.188) (2.903) (2.933) (2.996) (2.903) (2.899)
Observations 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534 11,534
R-squared 0.097 0.098 0.98 0.97 0.093 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.045
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
State Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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